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DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND CAPITAL SENTENCING:
THE TRIAL AND ERROR OF THE TRIAL METAPHOR
WALTER H. BENNETT, JR.*

I. INTRODUCTION

With its ruling Poland v. Arizona' in May, 1986, the United States
Supreme Court rendered its third major decision in five years on double
jeopardy in death penalty sentencing. This decision, together with the
two earlier decisions in Bullington v. Missouri2 and Arizona v. Rumsey3
represent the confluence of two of the more turbulent streams in criminal
law-the unpredictable and anarchic flow of double jeopardy cases and
the flood of emotionally charged issues and layered schemes present in
capital sentencing statutes. The United States Supreme Court's recent
attempts to negotiate these currents have been short-sighted and inconsistent and have lead to some surprising and inconclusive results. Perhaps,
given the complexity of the issues involved and the degree of anarchy
present in the genealogy of double jeopardy and death penalty sentencing
cases, such a state of affairs was inevitable, if not in some respects,
desirable. 4 It is a detriment, however, to anyone trying to reach a comprehensive understanding of the constitutional limitations in death penalty
sentencing or to predict the effects of appeal of a death sentence or capital
conviction. Further, it casts a pall upon any clear understanding of the
basic principles of double jeopardy as they apply in any number of contexts.
The purpose of this Article is to examine the opinions in Bullington,
Rumsey and Poland and to identify the confusion they engender, to look
at the case precedents which set the stage for the cantilevered reasoning
in those three cases, and to identify some basic and historically rooted
principles. When properly applied, these principles will provide a clearer
*Associate Clinical Professor, University of North Carolina School of Law. A.B., 1965, Washington and Lee University; J.D., 1972 and LL.M., 1986, University of Virginia. The author wishes
to express his appreciation to Professors Richard J. Bonnie of the University of Virginia Law School
and Richard A. Rosen of the University of North Carolina Law School for their helpful comments
and suggestions in the preparation of this Article.

i. 476 U.S. 147 (1986).
2. 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
3. 467 U.S. 203 (1984).
4. At least from the defendant's point of view. As I shall attempt to demonstrate later in this
Article, the clearest and simplest double jeopardy rule in death penalty sentencing will not necessarily
inure to the benefit of the defendant.
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route to more predictable results. This Article will attempt to show that
in applying the principle of double jeopardy to capital sentencing, the
United States Supreme Court observed stare decisis in a patch-work fashion. By ignoring central principles of double jeopardy which the Court
itself defined in Green v. UnitedStates5 and substituting instead two legaljargon gimmicks: the "trial metaphor" 6 and "clean slate doctrine," 7 the
Court reached convenient but short-sighted and ultimately irrational results. The gimmickry begins in Bullington, where at first blush it appears
to be a reasoned response to a number of precedential roadblocks. 8 As it
is applied through Rumsey and Poland, however, the perversity of the
approach becomes more apparent, and we are caught in the tangle of the
Court's misreason.
Finally, it is a purpose of this Article to reilluminate a seemingly
forgotten, alternative approach to the issues in Bullington and Rumsey
(though, as I will show, not in Poland)--an approach rooted, not in the
Double Jeopardy Clause, but in the Due Process Clause-and one which
was apparently ignored by the Supreme Court in deciding these two cases.
That alternative is generally referred to as the "chilling effect" doctrine,9
and, while it is apparently in current judicial disfavor, it is entirely appropriate to the issues faced by the Court in Bullington and Rumsey.
This Article provides no sine qua non of legal reasoning to unravel the
current tangle. The ultimate goal here is more modest: to provide a clearer
understanding of the missteps of the Court and the problems they create,
and to identify sounder bases than are presently being employed for
addressing those problems in their future manifestations.
II. THE PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY
AND THE COMPLEXITIES OF CAPITAL SENTENCING
A. The Purpose and Principles of Double Jeopardy
Professor Jay Sigler has ably chronicled the history of the principle of
5. 355 U.S. 184 (1957). Considerably more will be said regarding Green later in this Article. It
is a central case in the definition of the basic principles and purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
6. Bullington, 451 U.S. at 446. "Because the sentencing proceeding at petitioner's first trial was
like the trial on the question of guilt or innocence, the protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy
Clause to one aquitted by a jury also is available to him, with respect to the death penalty, at his
retrial." See also Rumsey, 467 U.S. at 209-12.
7. The clean slate doctrine was first named in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1968)
and was reapplied by the Court in Poland. 476 U.S. at 155.
8. The case law on double jeopardy has been developed in such patch-work fashion that one may
usually find a potential, precedential roadblock to almost any desired result in almost any new case.
The cases which posed potential problems for the Bullington majority are discussed infra notes 7688 and accompanying text.
9. The "chilling effect" doctrine in essence prohibits the government's discouragement of the
exercise of a procedural right (for example, a statutory right to appeal a criminal conviction) by
placing risks upon the exercise of that right (for example, an increased sentence after retrial if the

Spring 1989]

DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND CAPITAL SENTENCING

double jeopardy. 0 Its early origins in Greek and Roman law, development
in Britain and regermination in the American Constitution" are interesting
but unnecessary to review for the purposes of this Article. For the purposes
here, a good place to begin is the Supreme Court's classic statement of
the reasons underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause in Green v. United
States:
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the
Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all
its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated
attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling
him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well
as enhancing 2the possibility that even though innocent he may be
found guilty.'
In an excellent analysis of this subject, two able commentators, Professor Peter Westen and Richard Drubel, have noted that the Green statement identifies three basic (though interrelated) types of abuse from which
the Double Jeopardy Clause protects defendants: 1) additional embarrassment, expense and ordeal; 2) continuing anxiety over eventual outcome; and 3) increased possibility of erroneous guilty verdict. '" Messrs.
Westen and Drubel identify from another Supreme Court case, Wade v.
Hunter," and other mistrial and pre-verdict dismissal cases a fourth purpose closely related to the three above: a defendant's interest in having
his trial completed by a single tribunal. 5
appeal is successful). Its most vigorous application occurred in United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S.
570 (1967). See infra notes 56-68 and accompanying text.
10. J. StaLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY (1969); Sigler, A History of Double Jeopardy, 7 AM. J. LEG.
HIST. 283 (1963). See also United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 339-51 (1974); C. WHrrEBREAD,
CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 381-401 (1978).
i1. Ironically, much of the confusion and inconsistency which surrounds interpretation of the
Double Jeopardy Clause today and which has led to the use of catch-phrases and gimmickry described
above was itself engendered by the use of old, common law catch-phrases by the drafters of the
Bill of Rights. For example, the phrase which states that no one should "be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb" was, according to Professor Jay Sigler, supplied by James Madison and borrowed
from sources in existing, British common law. It replaced a more precise version approved by the
House of Representatives that no one "shall be subject... to more than one trial, or one punishment
for the same offence." Sigler, A History of Double Jeopardy, supra. note 10 at 306-307 (1963).
Professor Sigler goes on to observe that, "The drafters of the double jeopardy clauses were so
steeped in common law that they tended to perpetuate its inadequacies rather than declare a precise
protection for a criminal defendant." Id. That propensity and its legacy continue in double jeopardy
cases.
12. 355 U.S. at 187-88.
13. Westen & Drubel, Toward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 SuP. CT. REV. 81,
86. See also Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy: Reflections on Government Appeals of
Criminal Sentences, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1001 (1980).
14. 336 U.S. 684 (1949).
15. Westen & Drubel supra note 13. The authors find this purpose for the Double Jeopardy Clause
to be cited most often in mistrial cases (citing Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949)). See also Crist
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Green and Wade and the mistrial cases provide a well-reasoned and
indentifiable set of principles to apply in deciding double jeopardy cases.
Logically one would expect courts deciding double jeopardy cases to go
first to this well, draw upon these principles and apply them to the facts
of the case before them for decision. That is the system of analysis
programmed by the Green pronouncements.
Prior to Bullington, Rumsey and Poland, the Court had on at least one
occasion come close to the approach suggested in Green, notably in United
States v. Jorn.6 There Justice John Marshall Harlan specifically rejects
the use of catch-words and "mechanical rules"' 7 and proceeds with a
careful analysis of the principles announced in Green and Wade v. Hunter
and perpetuated in subsequent cases. He then begins to apply those
principles to the facts in the Jorn case, a trial judge's sua sponte order
of mistrial after impaneling a jury but before verdict, in order to allow
prosecution witnesses to consult with their attorneys before testifying.
Unfortunately, at this point, though the principles of double jeopardy as
applied appear to bar a retrial, Justice Harlan's analysis flounders into a
balancing test between the interests of the State and those of the defendant, 9 and Jorn misses becoming a model case for reasoned application of the principles of double jeopardy. But for its derailed finish,
Jorn would have provided such a model and would thereby have helped
ensure the quality double jeopardy analysis preordained in Green.
The level of analysis outlined in Green and almost achieved in Jorn
has generally been the exception rather than the rule. No clearer example
of this exists than the Court's struggle with the double jeopardy concept
in Bullington, Rumsey and Poland. To understand why this is so, one
v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 36 (1978). The right to trial by a single jury, established in Wade in the
context of a mistrial, was thereafter extended to trials terminated by the trial court's dismissal of
charges at the end of the state's evidence. United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975) (there, a
bench trial). Later, in an excellent example of the unpredictability and inconsistency of the Supreme
Court on double jeopardy issues, the Court [in an opinion by (now Chief) Justice Rehnquist] overruled
Jenkins (where the majority opinion was also written by Justice Rehnquist) and qualified Wade:
"[Wie believe we pressed too far in Jenkins the concept of the 'defendant's valued right to have
his trial completed by a particular tribunal' (citing Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949)). We
now conclude that where the defendant himself seeks to have the trial terminated without any
submission to either judge or jury as to his guilt or innocence, an appeal by the Government from
his successful effort to do so is not barred by 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976 ed.)." United States v. Scott,
437 U.S. 82, 100-101 (1978). This ruling is itself limited by the principle of Tibbs v. Florida, 457
U.S. 31 (1982), that reversal on appeal for insufficiency of evidence amounts to an "aquittal," and
retrial is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Scott majority acknowledged that, "A judgement
of aquittal, whether based on a jury verdict of not guilty or on a ruling by the court that the evidence
is insufficient to convict, may not be appealed and terminates the prosecution when a second trial
would be necessitated by reversal." Scott, 437 U.S. at 91.
16. 400 U.S. 470 (1971).
17. Id. at 480 and 486.
18. See supra note 15. See also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
19. 400 U.S. at 485-86.
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must first understand the position of these cases in the complex development of the law of death penalty trials and sentencing procedure.
B. Death Penalty Trial and Sentencing Law and the Implicationsfor
Double Jeopardy.
The seeds of Bullington, Rumsey and Poland were planted in Furman
v. Georgia,2" the decision which sent state legislatures back to their drawing boards and engendered the modem, bifurcated capital trial, including
variations in guided sentencing procedures for imposing the death penalty. 2 As a result of Furman, capital cases generally include a guilt/
innocence phase and a sentencing phase with the importance and complexity of the latter frequently outweighing those of the former. Whether
the second phase occurs, of course, depends upon the outcome of the
first, but the relation between the phases is more complex in its implications for rights to appeal and double jeopardy. For example, a defendant
may be charged with the capital crime of first degree murder, convicted
in phase one and receive a life sentence in phase two. The question arises
whether an appeal of the conviction will risk retrial and possible resentencing to death if the guilty verdict is overturned and retrial ensues. 22
Under unitary procedures in simpler cases in simpler times, appeal of a
conviction (and resulting sentence) that led to a reversal meant retrial
and, if a second guilty verdict ensued, resentencing.23 In allowing re20. 408 U.S. 238 (1972), reh'g denied, Jackson v. Georgia, 409 U.S. 902 (1972).
21. Upon capital sentencing schemes then in place, Furman had an effect somewhat similar to
a multi-directional road sign. A majority of the Court (Justices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, Stewart
and White) found the capital sentencing schemes in question violative of the prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment but did so for sometimes divergent
(though perhaps not always clearly distinct) reasons which they set forth in five separate concurring
opinions. At least four of these justices based their holding in whole or in part upon arbitrary and
capricious application of the death penalty. Furman, 408 U.S. at 256-57, 305, 309 and 312 (Douglas,
J.; Brennan, J.; White, J.; and Stewart, J., concurring).
In attempting to find direction from these opinions, legislatures chose what appeared to be the
two most likely routes: (I) elimination of discretion in the sentencer-in some cases in the form of
a mandated death penalty, and, (2) bifurcation of the trial into guilt/innocence and sentencing phases
and imposing upon the sentencing phase a guidance system for the exercise of discretion by the
sentencer. See Note, Discretion and the Constitutionality of the New Death Penalty Statutes, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1690 (1974). The former of these approaches was eventually condemned and the
latter approved by the United States Supreme Court in five opinions issued on the same day. Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida,428 U.S. 242,
reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875
(1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325,
reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 290 (1976). Thus the bifurcated capital trial evolved as the standard procedure.
(For further discussion of Gregg, Proffitt, Jurek, Woodson and Roberts, see infra note 25.)
22. Basically this was the procedural whipsaw confronted by the United States Supreme Court
in Bullington.
23. In North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1968) the United States Supreme Court held that
upon reversal of a conviction (through a post-conviction proceeding) for assault with intent to commit
rape, not only could there be retrial and resentence, but the right against double jeopardy did not
prevent an increase in sentence the second time around from 10 to 25 years.
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sentencing in such cases, the Supreme Court reasoned that a reversal of
the original conviction in effect, "wiped the slate clean," 24 and both sides
started over at retrial. It is much more difficult to reason so superficially
where the trial and sentencing procedure is bifurcated, and a fact-finderusually a jury2 5-has separately heard and weighed evidence and separately considered the burden of proof on guilt/innocence and on the appropriateness of the death penalty.
But the complexity does not stop with the relation between the guilt/
innocence and sentencing phases. Largely as a result of Furman and its
progeny,26 the sentencing phase frequently contains distinct factual and
legal issues (often in the form of "aggravating" and "mitigating" factors),
each of which may provide a basis for imposing or electing not to impose
a death sentence. Thus the issue arises whether successful appeal of a
death sentence based upon one aggravating factor allows the State to try
to prove (either again or for the first time) other aggravating factors not
found in the first sentencing. Again, in simpler times and under simpler
procedures a judge weighed all the factors in a sentencing proceeding,
and imposed, in her discretion, a sentence which was within legal limits
and which she considered fair. She was not second-guessed on resentencing as to which factors she weighed before and to what degree and
which factors she discarded. Under a typical, modem capital sentencing
scheme, individual aggravating and mitigating factors are separately noticed for proof by the State and defendant and similarly weighed and
specifically found or rejected by the jury. The sentencing choice is between
24. Id. at 720-21. See supra note 7.
25. At least some states allow a judge to decide the penalty phase of a capital proceeding. Arizona,
Idaho and Montana provide for sentencing by the trial judge only. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13703(B) (Supp. 1986); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(b) (Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. §46-18-301
(1983). Florida provides for sentencing by the trial judge, but she must be assisted by an advisory
jury. FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (1985). The majority of jurisdictions allowing the death penalty requires
the sentencing decision to be made by a jury. See Special Project, Capital Punishment in 1984:
Abandoning the Pursuit of Fairnessand Consistency, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1129, 1237-38 (1984)
[hereinafter Special Project].
26. See the discussion of Furman, Gregg, Proffitt, Jurek, Woodson and Roberts, supra note 21.
In Woodson and Roberts, a plurality composed of Justices Stewart, Powell and Stevens held that
mandatory sentences violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because, "[W]e believe that
in capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment . . .requires
consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the
particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of
death." Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304. Having stated clearly that a penalty phase with no discretion
was unconstitutional (Woodson and Roberts) and that unguided discretion was so as well (Furman)
the Court was left with the task of indicating what sort of guided discretion it had in mind. In Gregg,
the same plurality that spoke in Woodson and Roberts pointed with approval to the scheme of
aggravating and mitigating factors in the Model Penal Code. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 193-94. Most
states authorizing capital punishment have adopted sentencing schemes containing a list of aggravating
factors (and frequently an accompanying list of mitigating factors as well). See Special Project,
supra note 25, at 1220-21 n.615.
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life in prison and death, and the jeopardy implications of the first decision
are not so simple or easily discounted.
Among them, Bullington, Rumsey and Poland raise all of these problems. Bullington, probably procedurally the least complex of the three,
turns more upon the nature of the phase two sentencing procedure and
the effect of a general reversal of the conviction on appeal. Rumsey focuses
for the first time upon an error in sentencing itself-specifically the sentencing court's failure to find the existence of any aggravating circumstance-and the binding nature of that finding on appeal. Poland goes a
step further by the failure to find a particular aggravating factor where
others were erroneously found. Thus the focus is on the double jeopardy
effect (or lack thereof) of trial level findings on individual sentencing
factors. In this overview, the three cases represent an almost serial progression into the labyrinthian tangle of capital sentencing procedure. To
view this progression more closely, it will now be necessary to take it
one step at a time.
III. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE HOLDINGS IN
BULLINGTON, RUMSEY AND POLAND
A. Bullington v. Missouri
From the date Furman was decided and state legislatures began to
implement bifurcated capital proceedings, it was a matter of time until a
capital trial resulting in a life sentence was reversed and a state sought
to retry the defendant and subject him a second time to a sentencing
decision of life or death. In Bullington, the defendant was convicted of
capital murder and after the sentencing hearing was sentenced by the jury
to life without eligibility for parole for fifty years. He appealed and
obtained a reversal of his conviction (and sentence) because of error in
jury selection and not from an error directly related to the sentence itself.
A new trial was ordered, and the state served notice that it would again
seek the death penalty, alleging as a basis the same aggravating circumstances alleged in the first trial. On appeal the United States Supreme
Court was confronted with the issue of the double jeopardy implications
of the Missouri capital sentencing procedure as a whole; that is, were the
characteristics of the sentencing phase such that, once a decision was
reached in that phase, it should become a final decision for purposes of
double jeopardy, and not subject to eradication or reprocess simply because the guilt/innocence phase was to be redone?
Among post-Furman capital sentencing procedures, the State of Missouri's procedure was unremarkable. It required the sentencing jury to
proceed in escalating steps before it could impose a death sentence, and
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left open the option to impose life until the last step.27 Thus, the state
had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of one or more
aggravating circumstances, that those circumstances were sufficient to
warrant the death penalty and not outweighed by any mitigating factors.
Unless these hurdles were cleared, the jury would be without discretion
to impose death. Conversely, if they were cleared, the discretionary stage
of the sentencing process would be reached, and the jury would truly
hold the defendant's life in its hands. In Bullington's case the jury had
performed its function under this procedure, though it is unclear where
in the process the option for a life sentence was chosen.
The United States Supreme Court held that this statutory scheme to
determine life or death sufficiently resembled the guilt/innocence determination of a trial (the step in criminal procedure where jeopardy traditionally attaches)28 to preclude the state from subjecting the defendant
to sentencing a second time. 9 The Court structured its entire holding
upon this "trial metaphor," 3 ° using it not only as its justification for
application of the principle of double jeopardy, but also to select precedent
and distinguish other cases.
By enacting a capital sentencing procedure that resembles a trial
on the issue of guilt or innocence, however, Missouri explicitly requires the jury to determine whether the prosecution has 'proved its
case.' . . .
The Court already has held that many of the protections available
to a defendant at a criminal trial also are available at a sentencing
hearing similar to that required by Missouri in a capital case. See,
e.g., Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967) (due process protec-

tions such as right to counsel, right to confront witnesses, and right
to present favorable evidence are available at hearing at which sentence may be imposed based upon 'a new finding of fact

. . .

that

was not an ingredient of the offense charged,' id., at 608.) Because
the sentencing proceeding at petitioner's first trial was like the trial
on the question of guilt or innocence, the protection afforded by the
Double Jeopardy Clause to one acquitted by a jury also is available
to him, with respect to the death penalty at his retrial.3'
27. See Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 102-19 (1980) (chart summary of
capital punishment statutes of the various states). See also Note, The Double Jeopardy Clause
Expanded:HarsherSentences on RetrialProhibitedin Bifurcated CapitalOffense Hearings-Bulling-

ton v. Missouri, 31 DEPAUL L. REV. 623, 630 (1982).
28. "[Tlhat jeopardy attaches when the jury is impaneled and sworn is an integral part of the
constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy." Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 38 (1977).
29. See supra note 6.
30. For an in-depth analysis of the "trial metaphor" in death penalty sentencing, see Weisberg,
DeregulatingDeath, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 305.
31. 451 U.S. at 444-46.
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B. Arizona v. Rumsey
The second case in the capital sentencing/double jeopardy trilogy involved a capital sentencing scheme resembling in many respects the
scheme in Bullington3" but in the hands of a judge rather than a jury. On
one level the Court essentially reaffirmed the use of the trial metaphor
as a vehicle for analysis of capital sentencing/double jeopardy problems.
The Court found the trial-like elements of the Arizona scheme comparable
to those of the Missouri scheme in Bullington (the choice between the
two sentencing options of life and death,. a sentencing decision based
upon evidence presented, and a burden of proof upon the prosecution to
prove aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt) and concluded that
the substitution of judge for jury in the Arizona scheme, even where the
judge's decision for life was based upon legal error, made no difference:
the trial metaphor still applied. 33
However, the procedural level in Rumsey is a step deeper than that of
Bullington and portends the still more intricate labyrinth of Poland. In
Rumsey the original life sentence resulted when, through legal error, the
sentencing judge failed to consider the aggravating circumstance of killing
for pecuniary gain, which would have permitted imposition of the death
penalty and which was clearly supported by the evidence. No other aggravating circumstances were found. After appeal of the sentence and
remand, at resentencing on the same evidence, the trial court found the
aggravating circumstance of murder for pecuniary gain and sentenced the
defendant to death. Thus the Supreme Court had before it the question
of the double jeopardy effect of a sentencer's decision on one of a number
of possible aggravating circumstances, but as only one aggravating circumstance was at issue, and the same one at both sentencings, the Court
32. In Rumsey, the Arizona sentencing scheme also involved several steps; the state was required
to prove existence of at least one statutory, aggravating circumstance to the judge beyond a reasonable
doubt. If that was accomplished without the existence of any countervailing mitigating factors, death
became the mandatory sentence. If mitigating factors were found to exist, the sentencing was in the
discretion of the judge. Rumsey, 467 U.S. at 210; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (Supp. 19831984).
33. In fact the trial metaphor analysis was, if anything, stronger in Rumsey than in Bullington.
In Rumsey the majority so equated the sentence of life (instead of death) to a finding of innocence
(instead of guilt) that it sustained the life sentence even though it was based upon a clear legal error
by the judge, but for which the defendant would almost certainly have received a death sentence.
(The sentencing judge, under the erroneous impression that the statutory, aggravating circumstance
of murder for pecuniary gain only applied to killing for hire, failed to apply it to the defendant who
killed in the course of an armed robbery. Thus no aggravating circumstance was found, and the
defendant received a life sentence. Had the judge correctly interpreted the Arizona statute, ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F)(5), he probably would have found the single necessary aggravating
factor which, in the absence of any mitigating factors, would have mandated the death penalty.)
The Supreme Court disposed of this issue by rigid adherence to the trial metaphor: "Reliance on
an error of law, however, does not change the double jeopardy effects of a judgment that amounts
to an acquittal on the merits." Rumsey, 467 U.S. at 211.
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treated the double jeopardy problem essentially the same as it did in
Bullington, with the entire sentencing scheme (which in Rumsey narrowed
to the decision on one aggravating factor) resembling a guilt/innocence
trial. The complexities which could result from sentencing decisions based
upon more than one aggravating factor with reversals and resentencings
were not present in Rumsey, but the 'inevitability that they would occur
should have been obvious. That inevitability came to pass in Poland.
C. Poland v. Arizona
Thus by the time the Poland petitions were filed in the Supreme Court
in July, 1985,4 the Court had in its bag of precedents two recent double
jeopardy/capital sentencing cases which were strongly bound in terms of
the trial metaphor. The procedural complexity of Poland would strain
these bonds, but the Court persisted in its use of the metaphor, albeit
with selective application.
In Poland the defendants were convicted in phase one of first degree
murder. In phase two, the sentencer (an Arizona trial judge, as in Rumsey)
erroneously concluded (again, as in Rumsey) that murder for pecuniary
gain as an aggravating factor did not apply to murder in the course of an
armed robbery. He nevertheless sentenced the defendants to death on the
basis of a second factor which he found beyond a reasonable doubt: that
the murders were "especially heinous, cruel or depraved." 35 On appeal
the Arizona Supreme Court reversed the guilty verdict, reversed for insufficient evidence the finding that the murders were heinous, cruel or
depraved, and noted error in the trial judge's failure to consider the
aggravating circumstance of murder for pecuniary gain.36 The case was
remanded and retried, and the defendants were again convicted of first
degree murder and again faced a possible death sentence.
At the sentencing hearing the State again attempted to prove the aggravating factors of murder for pecuniary gain and that the murder was
especially heinous, cruel or depraved.37 The trial court found both factors
and again sentenced the defendants to death.38 On appeal the Arizona
Supreme Court again found insufficient evidence to support the heinous,
cruel or depraved factor but upheld the sentences on the basis of the
pecuniary gain factor." The Supreme Court affirmed, saying that as there
34. There were two Poland petitions (and two cases decided in one opinion)--that of Patrick
Gene Poland (No. 85-5023) filed July 2, 1985, and Michael Kent Poland (No. 85-5024) filed July
7, 1985, 54 U.S.L.W. 3260.
35. Poland, 476 U.S. at 149 (citing former ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-454(E)(6) (Supp. 1973)).
36. State v. Poland, 132 Ariz. 269, 645 P.2d 784 (1982).
37. Poland, 476 U.S. at 149.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 151.
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was no "aquittal" of the death penalty at the first sentencing, the reversal
on appeal of that sentence "wiped the slate clean" of the prior decision
and, in effect, both sides began anew, which eliminated any former
jeopardy.4" In answer to petitioner's argument that the Arizona Supreme
Court had on the first appeal effectively "aquitted" them of the death
penalty by finding the sole aggravating factor on which they were sentenced (heinous, depraved and cruel) unsupported by the evidence, the
Court said:
We reject the fundamental premise of petitioner's argument, namely,
that a capital sentencer's failure to find a particular aggravating circumstance alleged by the prosecution always constitutes an "aquittal"
of that circumstance for double jeopardy purposes. Bullington indicates that the proper inquiry is whether the sentencer or reviewing
court has "decided that the prosecution has not proved its case" that
the death penalty is appropriate. We are not prepared to extend

Bullington further and view the capital sentencing hearing as a set
of mini-trials on the existence of each aggravating circumstance.
Such an approach would push the analogy on which Bullington is
based past the breaking point."'
Presumably the reasoning which supports this result would also permit
the State to offer evidence (at the second sentencing) on aggravating
factors which it did not pursue at the first sentencing. (In fact, this may
have occurred in the case of Patrick Poland where the sentencing court,
in addition to finding the aggravating factor of pecuniary gain, which
was erroneously disallowed as a factor at the first sentencing, also found
the factor of prior conviction of violence.42 The prior conviction of violence factor was not found by the first sentencer, though it is unclear
whether the state attempted to prove that factor at the first sentencing.)43
This prospect runs afoul of a number of the basic tenets of double jeopardy
40. Id. at 157.
41. Id. at 155-56.
42. State v. Poland, 144 Ariz. 388, 406, 698 P.2d 183, 199-201 (1985).
43. State v. Poland, 132 Ariz. 269, 645 P.2d 784 (1982). See also State v. Jones, 336 S.E.2d
385, 388 (N.C. 1985) wherein the North Carolina Supreme Court in a non-capital sentencing held
that resentencing after appeal was de novo and new aggravating factors could be considered. But
see Singleton v. Lockhart, 653 F. Supp. 1114 (E.D. Ark. 1986), where, in ruling upon a habeas
corpus petition, the court held that a prosecutor who relied upon the sole factor of pecuniary gain
to obtain the first death sentence, was barred by the right against double jeopardy from seeking the
death sentence on rehearing based upon an entirely new factor on which no evidence had been
offered at the first sentencing hearing. The Arkansas Federal District Court distinguished Poland by
saying:
Thus, the Poland case is distinguishable from the instant case in a critical way.
Namely, this Court found nothing else in the record to support the death sentence
after it was determined that "pecuniary gain" was invalidly offered. The Arizona
Supreme Court, in contrast, after finding insufficient evidence on the "heinous,
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which appear in Green v. United States and which were addressed previously in this Article." For the present, it is sufficient to note that the
implications of Poland allow the prosecution, not only to benefit from
and rectify mistakes it made at the first sentencing hearing, but to add,
in effect, new factual and legal theories in order to obtain a death penalty
where other theories have failed. Unlike the defendant in a guilt/innocence
trial where, for example, one tried for murder on one theory is protected
by the Double Jeopardy Clause from retrial for the same murder on some
alternate theory,45 the capital sentencing defendant after Poland may face
resentencing to death on some entirely new theory not mentioned at the
first sentencing. Clearly, in Poland the walls of the trial metaphor did
not hold.
D. Comparing The Bullington-Rumsey-Poland Trilogy
To understand why the Poland Court subverted its own tool of analysis,
the trial metaphor, it is instructive to compare the reasoning and structure
cruel or depraved" circumstance, went on to also find that the trial court had
wrongly interpreted the "pecuniary gain" statute. It further concluded that had
the trial court properly construed this state statute, the sentencing court might
have imposed the death sentence on the basis of the evidence placed in the record
by the prosecutor. . . . On this record, the U.S. Supreme Court found that neither
the sentencing court nor the Arizona Supreme Court had held that there was no
basis for the death sentence. Thus there had been no "aquittal," at either level,
and the Supreme Court could conclude that jeopardy had not attached. . . . This
Court reads Poland to mean that the state may resentence a convicted murderer
whose death penalty has been set aside, provided that no court has determined
that the state failed to prove any other basis upon which a second death sentence
might rest. In other words, if either the trial court or a reviewing court finds that,
after removal of any infirm factors, the residual evidence offered by the state at
the initial proceeding will not support a death verdict, then the state has failed
in its proof and may not try again.
Id. at 1140-41.
Whether this distinction will survive the test in higher courts is unclear, but the reasoning underlying
it is true to the "aquittal" analogy in the trial metaphor as stated in Bullington. The distinction in
Singleton is also consistent with the Poland majority's distinction of the facts in that case from those
in Rumsey. In the latter, there had been at some point an "aquittal," however erroneous, of any
aggravating factors. In Poland that critical juncture had never occurred. Poland, 476 U.S. at 15556.
44. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
45. This is, of course, the bone and marrow of the double jeopardy prohibition.
In United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669 (1896), this Court observed: The
Constitution of the United States, in the Fifth Amendment, declares, 'nor shall
any person be subject [for the same offense] to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb.' The prohibition is not against being twice punished, but against being
twice put in jeopardy. . . .(Emphasis added.) The 'twice put in jeopardy' language
of the Constitution thus relates to a potential, i.e., the risk that an accused for a
second time will be convicted of the 'same offense' for which he was initially
tried.
Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 326 (1969).
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in Poland with that of Rumsey where the trial metaphor was faithfully
applied. In Rumsey, the United States Supreme Court held that the right
against double jeopardy insulated the defendant from a second sentencing
hearing and risk of death sentence based upon an aggravating factor that
was erroneously eliminated by the sentencer at the first sentencing hearing. In effect, the trial court's ruling, however erroneous, amounted in
that case to an "acquittal" of the death penalty, and the defendant could
not be resentenced.46 After their first appeal and retrial, the Poland brothers
again faced a sentencing hearing. The State again offered evidence to
prove two aggravating factors: murder for pecuniary gain and that the
47
murder was especially heinous, cruel or depraved. One of these factors,

the heinous, cruel or depraved factor, had already been presented by the
State and found on appeal to be supported by insufficient evidence. That
finding would be fatal to a guilty verdict in a guilt/innocence trial.48 The
other factor, murder for pecuniary gain, was rejected by the trial court
on the identical basis erroneously cited by the sentencing judge in Rumsey,
which was insufficiency of evidence. The only glaring difference between
the situation of defendant Rumsey and defendants Poland on resentencing
is that, by incorrectly finding the heinous, cruel or depraved factor, the
Poland trial court imposed the death penalty at the first sentencing and
the Rumsey court did not.49 It is upon this factor that the United States
-46. "The double jeopardy principle relevant to respondent's case is the same as that invoked in
Bullington: an acquittal on the merits by the sole decisionmaker in the proceeding is final and bars
retrial on the same charge." Rumsey, 467 U.S. at 211.
47. The State also successfully offered proof in Patrick Poland's case of a third aggravating factor:
prior conviction of a violent crime. Poland, 476 U.S. at 151.
48. The United States Supreme Court held in Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978), and
Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 (1977), that a reversal on appeal of a conviction on the grounds of
legal insufficiency of the evidence precluded retrial under the Double Jeopardy Clause. In Tibbs v.
Florida, 457 U.S. 31 (1982), the Supreme Court refused to extend the ruling of Burks and Greene
to situations where the reversal was based upon the weight of the evidence rather than its legal
insufficiency. In making its distinction the Court again focused upon the issue of acquittal:
[The appellate court sits as a 'thirteenth juror' and disagrees with the jury's
resolution of the conflicting testimony. This difference of opinion no more signifies
acquittal than does a disagreement among the jurors themselves. A deadlocked
jury, we consistently have recognized, does not result in an acquittal barring retrial
under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Similarly, an appellate, court's disagreement
with the jurors' weighing of the evidence does not require the special deference
accorded verdicts of acquittal.
Tibbs, 457 U.S. at 42.
See also, Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140 (1986), a case decided the same day as Poland,
which holds that granting a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence at the close of the State's
case was an "acquittal" for purposes of double jeopardy; and United States v. Martin Linen Supply,
430 U.S. 564 (1977), the case most frequently cited as authority that a judgment of insufficient
evidence is an acquittal for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
49. See Marshall, J., dissenting; joined by Brennan, J., and Blackmun, J.:
There is one difference between these cases and Arizona v. Rumsey (citation
omitted) in which seven Members of this Court interpreted the Double Jeopardy
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Supreme Court attempts to hang the trial metaphor in Poland.
To do so, the majority shifts from its method in Bullington and Rumsey
of focusing upon those aspects of capital sentencing procedures which
resemble a guilt/innocence trial, to a focus upon one of those aspects
alone-the "verdict." The central question then becomes whether there
has been, at the first sentencing, a "verdict" of "acquittal" of the death
penalty. In Rumsey, where the trial court erroneously excluded the pecuniary gain aggravating factor and imposed a life sentence, the answer
was "yes;" in Poland, where the trial court also erroneously excluded
the pecuniary gain factor but erroneously found the second factor of
heinous, cruel or depraved and on that basis imposed the death penalty,
it was "no." On the basis of this reasoning the Court in Poland allowed
resentencing together with new offers of proof and new findings on both
aggravating factors of murder for pecuniary gain and heinous, cruel and
depraved.' The Court does not proceed to the next logical step after
Bullington of extending the trial metaphor to proof and findings on individual aggravating circumstances, though logical application of the trial
metaphor clearly leads to that result. All the basic ingredients of a trial,
cited by the Court in Bullington and Rumsey to support application of
the trial metaphor to capital sentencing hearings as a whole are present
in sentencing decisions on individual aggravating factors. The Court listed
those ingredients in Rumsey:
The discretion of the sentencer . . . is restricted to precisely two
options: [In Rumsey choice between the death sentence and life without the possibility of parole for fifty years and in Poland to find the
existence of the aggravating factor or the lack thereof] ....
In addition, the sentencer is to make its decision guided by substantive
standards and based on evidence introduced in a separate proceeding
that formally resembles a trial. Finally the prosecution has to prove
certain statutorily defined facts beyond a reasonable doubt in order
to support a sentence of death.5
Clause to bar imposition of a death sentence after a life sentence has been reversed
on appeal: the sentencing judge in petitioners' case made two errors of state law,
while Rumsey's judge made only one.
Poland, 476 U.S. at 157.
50. By the time Poland reached the Supreme Court, only one aggravating factor remained to
support the death penalty in the case of defendant Michael Poland (pecuniary gain), and two remained
to support the sentence of defendant Patrick Poland (pecuniary gain and prior conviction of violence).
The Arizona Supreme Court, for the second time in both cases, had found the evidence at sentencing
insufficient to support a finding of especially heinous, cruel or depraved. State v. Poland (Patrick),
144 Ariz. 388, 404-06, 698 P.2d 183, 194-201 (1985); State v. Poland (Michael), 144 Ariz. 412,
415, 698 P.2d 207, 210 (1985). However, had the state met its burden on the latter aggravating
circumstance the second time around after having failed to do so at the first sentencing, the Poland
majority would apparently have allowed that circumstance as a basis for imposing the death penalty.
See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
51. Rumsey, 467 U.S. at 209, describing aspects of the sentencing phase in Arizona which
resembled a guilt/innocence trial.
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Why did the Court in Poland decline to extend the use of the trial
metaphor to decisions on individual aggravating factors? There are arguable reasons for it, for example, the anxiety factor: a defendant given
a life sentence has reached a point of finality and has a right to be free
of the anxiety of facing the death penalty during appeal whereas the
defendant receiving the death penalty on the first sentencing does not.
The Court does not address such factors. Rather, hampered by its own
prediliction for the catch-phrase and metaphor and its tendency since
Bullington to opt for the simple formula, it remains locked in its own
track, unable to analyze beyond that track or to follow that course to the
logical conclusion. Instead, when confronted in Poland with the logical
conclusion of the course it set in Bullington, the Court contents itself
with a statement which in essence says simply: "We will not go that
far. ,52
If the Court prefers metaphor and analogy to deep reasoning in these
cases, it conspicuously omitted the obvious analogy between decisions
on individual aggravating circumstances at sentencing and guilt/innocence
decisions on individual counts of a multi-count indictment at trial. Under
this analogy, if the sentencer was reversed on appeal for finding an
aggravating factor based on insufficient evidence, or a judge dismissed
the State's case on an aggravating factor as a matter of law (both of which
occurred in Poland), on resentencing the original decisions on the reversed
and dismissed factors would be final just as similar decisions on individual
counts in a criminal indictment would be final. 53 This would be true of
the capital sentencing decisions regardless of whether the original death
sentence was based upon other factors. The PolandCourt does not consider such an analogy and gives us no reason for stopping short except,
as noted above, its disinclination to follow its own methods begun in
Bullington to their logical end.
The apparent lesson of this twisting progression from Bullington to
Rumsey to Poland is this: that regardless of the errors in law and facts,
if the defendant received a life sentence at the first sentencing, double
52. See Poland, 476 U.S. at 155-56: "We are not prepared to extend Bullington further," and
[to do so] "would push the analogy on which Bullington is based past the breaking point."
53. That retrial on individual, criminal counts which were previously dismissed after attachment
of jeopardy is barred under the Double Jeopardy Clause-regardless of the fate of the other countsseems so basic that it does not require further substantiation. Indeed, not a great deal exists. The
leading case is Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), wherein the United States Supreme Court
barred on double jeopardy grounds retrial on a larceny charge on which, as one count of a twocount burglary and larceny indictment, there had been an aquittal at the first trial. The burglary count
had survived the first trial and conviction on that count provided the basis for appeal. Retrial on
that count was not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. See also United States v. Armco Steel
Corp. 252 F. Supp. 364 (S.D. Cal. 1966); Chapin v. State, 671 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984);
and Ex Parte Scelles, 511 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974), all of which involve attempts to
retry a defendant on one count of a multi-count indictment where there had either been an aquittal
on the count in question or it had been dismissed.
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jeopardy attaches, but if he received a death sentence, it does not, even
if the procedural boundaries crossed were in substance, if not in result,
basically the same. To borrow a phrase from the Poland majority, this
stretches the trial metaphor "past the breaking point." 54 It hangs the
outcome upon only one facet of the trial metaphor, the "verdict," and
ignores, not only the other aspects of a trial (reviewed in the Bullington
and Rumsey opinions)" which weigh in favor of jeopardy attaching, but
the time-tested reasons behind the attachment of jeopardy when those
aspects are present. 56 And this is the primary failing of the BullingtonRumsey-Poland trilogy and the application therein of the trial metaphor.
The opinions lose sight of the basic principles and reasons underlying
the Double Jeopardy Clause. In order to understand why the Court embarked on this course in this trilogy of cases, it is necessary to examine
some of the more prominent twists and turns in the development of the
concept of double jeopardy and their implications for capital sentencing
as Bullington took its place on the United States Supreme Court docket.
Before that is assayed, however, we should briefly turn our focus upon
another missing link, frequently appearing in some of the older double
jeopardy cases and essential, to a fundamental understanding of the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause. It is a link which was totally
ignored in the Bullington, Rumsey and Poland decisions.
IV. THE LOST STRAND OF THE DUE PROCESS ("CHILLING
EFFECT") DOCTRINE IN DOUBLE JEOPARDY CASES
The Bullington, Rumsey and Poland decisions leave a number of unanswered questions with implications for double jeopardy and capital
sentencing." One of the more disturbing of these is the present status of
54. 476 U.S. at 155-56. See supra note 52.
55. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
56. These are the underlying reasons outlined in Green and recognized in part by the Bullington
majority, 451 U.S. at 445. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
57. Some other questions which are left dangling by the Bullington, Rumsey, and Poland opinions
are: Does the trial metaphor analysis of these three cases apply to non-capital sentencing proceedings
which sufficiently resemble a guilt/innocence trial? At least one circuit court has held that the rationale
of Bullington applies to sentencing procedure for enhanced sentence as an habitual offender. Briggs
v. Procunier, 764 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1985). See also French v. Estelle, 692 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 937 (1983), an earlier holding by the same court to the same effect,
involving the same Texas statute.
Other issues have arisen in various circuit courts. For example, there is the question, addressed
by the Fifth Circuit, of the applicability of the Bullington holding to resentencing in a felony-murder
case where, at the first trial, the Court failed to instruct upon, and the jury failed to find, a specific
intent to kill. Jones v. Thigpen, 741 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. granted and vacated. Thigpen
v. Jones 475 U.S. 1003 (1986). The United States Court of Appeals held that such a defect amounted
to a failure of evidence under Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), and that under the trial
metaphor analysis of Bullington, resentencing to death was barred even though the defendent was
sentenced to death at the first hearing. Other post-Bullington circuit court cases dealing with issues
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the "chilling effect" doctrine. This doctrine springs from the Due Process
(and not the Double Jeopardy) Clause of the Constitution and recognizes
the possible, detrimental conflict between a defendant's procedural rights
(for example, to appeal) and the risk of incurring a greater sentence (in
this case, death-the "big chill").58 "Chilling effect" cases are usually
set in a double jeopardy context, and the facts which give rise to one
frequently gives rise to both. The issue in double jeopardy cases is whether
raised by Bullington are: United States ex rel. Young v. Lane, 768 F.2d 834 (7th Cir. 1985), Young
v. Kemp, 760 F.2d 1097 (1 Ith Cir. 1985) and Knapp v. Cardwell, 667 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982)
(dealing with issues of the double jeopardy effects of sentencer findings on individual aggravating
factors, as in Poland).
Finally, there is possibly a lingering question of whether the right against double jeopardy after
Bullington would apply to a capital sentencing scheme which is not like a guilt/innocence trial or
less like a guilt/innocence trial than the Missouri and Arizona schemes in Bullington, Rumsey and
Poland. Underlying this question is the issue of whether a bifurcated sentencing procedure is now
mandatory in death penalty cases and to what degree the Eighth Amendment requires that the jury
(or judge) be guided in its sentencing decisions to avoid arbitrary or disproportionate application.
See discussion of these issues supra notes 21, 25 and 26.
It may be that as a practical matter a bifurcated proceeding is now required; the schemes which
the Supreme Court has approved have all been bifurcated. See Sumner.v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66,
(1987). However, the Court has not stated this absolutely, and its necessity is not absolutely certain.
Whether the sentencing phase must resemble a trial and to what degree is less certain.
While the Court has not provided definitive answers to the question, it has afforded some guidance
on the necessity for specific procedural safeguards which, in addition to the right against double
jeopardy, the Court has held apply to capital sentencing procedures. For example, a defendant is
guaranteed the right to present relevant evidence in mitigation, Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S.
1 (1986); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), even where the evidence is outside statutory
mitigating factors, Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, (1987). The Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel apply. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454
(1981). Hearsay evidence is prohibited by the right to due process of law. Green v. Georgia, 442
U.S. 95 (1979), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 936, reh'g denied, 451 U.S. 933 (1981). The right to due
process also prevents imposition of a death sentence based upon an aggravating factor (another
crime) of which the defendant was not legitimately convicted, Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U.S. 14
(1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 957 (1979), or upon a presentence
report which was not revealed to the defendant. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977). It is yet
unclear whether it is constitutionally required that the State carry the burden of proving aggravating
factors beyond a reasonable doubt. See Ford v. Strickland, 696 F.2d 804, 817-19 (11 th Cir. 1983)
(en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865 (1983) and id., at 876-82 (Anderson, J.,
dissenting). See also Smith v. North Carolina, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982) (mem., Stevens, J., respecting
denial of petition for writ of certiorari). But the question remains whether all of this adds up to a
mandatory "trial-like" procedure.
For general discussions of what procedure is required in capital sentencing, see Weisburg, supra
note 30, on the undoing of the "guided discretion" formula that many felt was the holding in Furman
and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), and specifically on the question of whether a bifurcated
proceeding is required after the Court's statement in Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195, that, "as a general
proposition" the concerns of the Court with capital sentencing could be "best met" by use of a
bifurcate proceeding. Weisburg, supra note 30, at 309. See also Note, The Assumption of Life: A
Starting Point for a Due Process Analysis of Capital Sentencing. 94 YALE L. J. 351, 366 (1984).
58. This issue is more clearly raised in Bullington than in Rumsey or Poland because the defendant's appeal in Bullington was directed at errors in the guilt/innocence phase and not at errors
in sentence as was true in Rumsey and Poland. The "chill" is the risk incurred by one who, having
received a life sentence, appeals his guilty verdict, obtains a reversal, and as a result faces the death
sentence anew.
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a defendant is being twice put in jeopardy; the issue in chilling effect
cases is whether the risk of a second "jeopardy" unconstitutionally chills
the exercise of a basic right.
Several capital cases preceding Bullington in which this doctrine was
applied leave some question as to its present viability. The United States
Supreme Court has held, for example, that capital defendants were not
denied their right to trial by jury by the choice between having a jury
trial and risking the death penalty or waiving that right and entering a
guilty plea to obtain a life sentence.5 9 In Crampton v. Ohio, the Court
refused to relieve the defendant, on trial for his life in a unitary trial and
sentencing procedure, of the choice between foregoing his right to remain
silent at trial or losing the opportunity to testify in mitigation of possible
punishment (and thereby perhaps running a greater risk of imposition of
the death penalty).'
Two years later, in a case decided the same year as Furman v. Georgia,
the United States Supreme Court applied this rationale to a procedural
scenario involving the issues of double jeopardy and sentencing under a
statute carrying a possible death penalty. In Chaffin v. Stynchcombe," the
Court held that the possibility of a chilling effect on appeal of a harsher
sentence did not invalidate resentencing of a defendant to a term in excess
of that received at his first trial. The defendant in Chaffin received fifteen
years for robbery by force at his first sentencing and a life sentence after
retrial following appeal. He faced a possible death sentence on both
occasions. Writing for the majority, Mr. Justice Powell noted that Chaffin
himself was not, "'chilled' in the exercise of his right to appeal" and
doubted "that the 'chill factor' will often be a deterrent of any significance" because he found the prospect of defendant's facing a higher
sentencing highly contingent.6 2
Petitioner was not himself 'chilled' in the exercise of his right to
appeal by the possibility of a higher sentence on retrial and we doubt
that the 'chill factor' will often be a deterrent of any significance.
Unlike the guilty-plea situation and, to a lesser extent, the nonbifurcated capital trial, the likelihood of actually receiving a harsher
sentence is quite remote at the time a convicted defendant begins to
weigh the question whether he will appeal. Several contingencies
59. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970);
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
60. 402 U.S. 183 (1971), vacated, 408 U.S. 941 (1972). Crampton was decided as a companion
case to McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), the pre-Furman case which was, in practical
effect, overruled by the Furman decision. As noted previously, supra note 57, it is quite possible
that the Crampton holding, that a bifurcated procedure is not necessary in capital cases, does not
survive Furman and its progeny.
61. 412 U.S. 17 (1973).
62. Id. at 33.
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must coalesce. First, his appeal must succeed. Second, it must result
in an order remanding the case for retrial rather than dismissing
outright. Third, the prosecutor must again make the decision to prosecute and the accused must again select trial by jury rather than
securing a bench trial or negotiating a plea. Finally, the jury must
again convict and then ultimately the jury or the judge must arrive
at a harsher sentence in circumstances devoid of a genuine likelihood
of vindictiveness. 63
In reaching this conclusion the United States Supreme Court attempted
to distinguish the leading case on the chilling effect doctrine where the
choice was between exercise of a procedural right and the risk of incurring
the death penalty. In United States v. Jackson,' the Court held that
requiring the defendant to choose between a bench trial (without the
possibility of a death penalty) and trial by jury (by which a death sentence
could be imposed) unconstitutionally chilled the defendant's exercise of
his right to jury trial. The test applied in Jackson was a "necessity"
inquiry.65 The Court concluded that the chilling effect on the defendant's

right to choose a jury trial was unnecessary to the Government's purpose
to have the death penalty imposed only by a jury. (For example, as a
non-chilling alternative, the Government could require a jury to choose
between life and death sentences in all capital cases, which reached the
sentencing stage regardless of whether they were tried before a judge or
a jury.).'
The majority opinion in Chaffin notes the application of the "necessity"
test in Jackson and then fails to apply it to the procedural issues in
9
Chaffin,67 preferring instead to cite Brady v. United States' and Crampton
and, then, as the above excerpt from Chaffin reveals, to denigrate the
likelihood of the chilling effect of a possible death penalty upon one
seeking reversal of a trial in which the sentence was life. This exercise
at sleight-of-hand was probably not accidental. Application of the "necessity" test to the sentencing procedure in Chaffin would have raised
interesting questions, such as, whether the state has a legitimate interest
in having a defendant face a death sentence a second time after a fully
informed jury has, without error in sentencing, pronounced a sentence
of fifteen years at the first trial. The State has already had its "day in
63. Id. at 33-34.
64. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
65. "The question is not whether the chilling effect is 'incidental' rather than intentional; the
question is whether that effect is unnecessary and therefore excessive." Id. at 582.
66. Id.
67. Justice Marshall emphasizes this omission in his dissent in Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 44-45
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
68. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
69. 402 U.S. 183 (1971). See supra note 60.
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court" and lost on the death penalty issue. If the State can legitimately
claim such an interest, then perhaps the chilling effect on the defendant's
right to appeal is necessary. The interests of the State in this instance,
however, are less persuasive than those in Jackson (Government's interest
in having a jury decide between life and death) or Brady (State's interest
in the tool of plea bargaining as well as its interest in exposing the
defendant to the death penalty). In the appeal/retrial scenario of Chaffin,
the State's interest in exposing the defendant to the death penalty has
already been served once. Having failed to achieve that purpose after one
fair opportunity, it is difficultto believe that the State's interest extends
to going around again.
The Bullington majority did not address these issues7' even so much
as to say that the chilling effect argument was settled by Chaffin. Had it
applied the "necessity" test of Jackson, as the Court failed to do in
Chaffin, the issues raised would have been essentially those set out above.
But the case for a real chilling effect would have been stronger in Bullington. There, unlike Chaffin, the charge was murder and the sentence
choice was between life and death, not life, death, or a term of years.
Many of the contingencies to the chilling effect which were listed by the
Chaffin court are less contingent under the facts of Bullington. Where the
charge is murder, the prosecutor is more likely to retry the defendant,
and much more likely to seek the death penalty. If that is done, the
defendant will have no choice. To avoid the death penalty, the defendant
must select a bench (rather than a jury) trial, as Justice Powell suggested
in Chaffin. Furthermore, the chances of a plea bargain to avoid a second
capital trial are probably not good for most defendants charged with capital
murder where the State has already persisted in seeking the death penalty
through one capital trial and sentencing. There is also a serious question
as to whether the Chaffin majority's disbelief in the reality of a chilling
effect is accurate for a defendant who has received any sentence less than
death but risks retrial for his life if he is successful on appeal. Certainly
the risk is contingent, but throughout the appellate process, if it is attempted, the appellant cannot but suspect that he may be working for his
own doom. Did the petitioner in Chaffin weigh these odds? Did he even
know, with the Jackson case as precedent, that he ran the risk of a harsher
sentence after a successful appeal?
The essential unanswered question left by Bullington on the chilling
effect doctrine (unless Chaffin answers it), is this: Whether it is consti70. Apparently the "chilling effect" argument was raised in some form by the petitioner, though
the focus was upon the death penalty's deterrence upon the exercise of the right to jury trial at
retrial. See Chatsky, Extending Double Jeopardy Protections to Sentencing, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
127, 142, n.107 (1982).
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tutionally permissible to require a defendant with a life sentence who
feels there were serious errors in his capital trial of guilt or innocence,
to forego raising those issues on appeal in order to avoid risking a death
sentence for the second time. This is a due process and not specifically
a double jeopardy issue, but it involves many of the same considerations,
and the interests of the defendant under both inquiries, particularly in
death sentence cases, are closely related. There will be a more appropriate
opportunity to examine these connections at a later point in this Article
and to discuss the appropriateness of the chilling effect doctrine to the
Bullington and Rumsey cases. At this point it will be beneficial to examine
the tortured development of the various double jeopardy doctrines which
led the Court inexorably to the Bullington decision. One must understand
how the Court got into the current predicament in order to better understand how the Court may perhaps get out.
V. THE CONFLUENCE OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY ISSUES
WITH THE COMPLEXITIES OF CAPITAL SENTENCING
Given the clear and careful delineation of the principles underlying the
Double Jeopardy Clause set out in Green v. United States7 ' and discussed
briefly above, 72 the Court's resort to the trial metaphor in Bullington
seems at first rather puzzling. Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in
Bullington quotes in full the statement of principles from Green in support
of the established principle of finality of a verdict of aquittal on the issue
of guilt or innocence.73 Then, in rather cursory fashion, he asserts that
the embarrassment, expense, ordeal and anxiety and insecurity factors
outlined in Green, "faced by a defendant at the penalty phases of a
Missouri capital murder trial surely are at least equivalent to that faced
by any defendant at the guilt phase of a criminal trial," and that there
existed an, "unacceptably high risk" that the prosecution could wear
down the defendant with a retrial, "thereby leading to an erroneously
imposed death sentence. "7 4 At this point analysis stops. Justice Blackmun
grabs the rung of the trial metaphor, and detailed inquiry into the relation
between the underlying purpose of the right against double jeopardy and
capital sentencing is left stranded. In dissent, Justice Powell devotes more
time to the subject, but provides no more insight, concluding rather
simplistically that since the defendant will face a retrial after appeal
anyway, the addition of a second sentencing decision between life and
death will add little significance to the embarrassment and ordeal already
71.
72.
73.
74.

355 U.S. 184 (1957).
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
Bullington, 451 U.S. at 445.
Id.
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in store.75 In Rumsey and Poland the Court is so consumed by application
of the trial metaphor as the established means of analysis that discussion
of the reasons underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause are virtually nil.
If the literary purpose of a metaphor is to sharpen speech and illuminate
meaning, the use of the "trial metaphor" by the Bullington court fails
that purpose. In Bullington the convenient trial analogy serves as a substitute for thorough reasoning and analysis and in fact smothers it. As a
result, the opinion misses an essential link between the purposes underlying the double jeopardy principle and the particular significance of those
purposes in a sentencing procedure where the ultimate choice is between
life and death. The developing strands of double jeopardy law and the
law of modem capital sentencing are never properly entwined, and partially as a result of this failure we are left with some of the unanswered
questions discussed in this Article in Parts III and IV, above.
To understand why the Court adopted this approach and the alternative
tools which it had at hand, it is necessary to review briefly the evolution
of the relation between double jeopardy theory and capital sentencing
until the time Bullington was decided. This undertaking will involve
tracing the development of several strands of legal argument as they
converge on the Bullington opinion, and it may perhaps facilitate the task
to borrow a method from the Bullington, Rumsey and Poland decisions
and resort to metaphor. In this case, the linking of strands from various
directions to form a rope with Bullington (and Rumsey and Poland) are
viewed as a tangle at the end. The metaphor is imperfect, as the strands
are of different weight, and at least two of them are cut before the end
(one of those is the "chilling effect" strand discussed previously in this
Article). 76 For the purposes of analysis, the strands may be identified as
follows:
1) The main strand--double jeopardy and resentencing in capital and
non-capital cases.
2) The due process strand, which is really two sometimes related
strands-the "chilling effect" strand (2a) and the vindictiveness strand
(2b) (the danger that upon retrial the defendant will be subjected to a
harsher sentence as a result of judicial vindictiveness).
3) The guilt/innocence, acquittal strand, which before Bullington was
not adapted to the sentencing phase of a bifurcated trial. A thread of this
strand is the legal insufficiency of evidence strand which treats reversal
on appeal for legal insufficiency of evidence as an acquittal for double
jeopardy purposes.
4) The waiver (by choosing to appeal) of the right to plead double
75. Id. at 451 (Powell, J., dissenting).
76. See supra notes 58-70 and accompanying text.
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jeopardy strand-a pernicious, theoretical thread that one may now hope
is severed and consigned to the judicial trash heap of posterity.
To trace the mingling of these strands and their effects upon each other,
we may begin with the decision in Stroud v. United States,'77 which is
the essential analytical ancestor of Bullington from the by-gone era of
simpler, death penalty jurisprudence and unitary, capital trials. Stroud
held simply that after reversal on appeal of a unitary capital trial, resulting
in a conviction and a life sentence, the right against double jeopardy does
not bar a sentence of death on retrial. The case is virtually void of analysis,
devoting less than a page to its holding on double jeopardy. 78 The purposes
of the double jeopardy clause, enunciated later by the Court in Green
and other cases, are not mentioned. The Court did pause briefly to tie in
the waiver strand noting that, "the plaintiff in error himself invoked the
action of the court which resulted in further trial. In such cases he is79not
placed in second jeopardy within the meaning of the Constitution."
Almost fifty years later in North Carolinav. Pearce8" the United States
Supreme Court dealt again with the issue of imposition of a greater
sentence upon retrial after appeal. In Pearce there was an increase from
a ten year sentence at the first trial to twenty-five years at the second
trial. The second sentence was imposed by a judge rather than a jury.
The Court viewed the double jeopardy issue to be controlled by Stroud,
and without pursuing any in-depth analysis of the purposes behind the
double jeopardy clause, gave an explanation for and (inadvertently) a
new name to the Stroud rule-the "clean slate" doctrine. The Court stated:
"Although rationale for this 'well-established part of our constitutional
jurisprudence' has been variously verbalized, it rests ultimately upon the
premise that the original conviction has, at the defendant's behest, been
wholly nullified and the slate wiped clean." 8 ' One may also discern
entwined in this statement the (then still viable) thread of the waiver
theory: The defendant is in this predicament at his own "behest."
In addition to the double jeopardy issue, which it disposed of on
authority of Stroud, the Pearce opinion also took up a due process argument, and the development of this strand (or strands) in that case
warrants inspection. Basically the Court held that due process of law,
"requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully
attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives
after a new trial." 82 As a safeguard against this abuse, the Court required
77.
78.
79.
theory
80.
81.
82.

251 U.S. 15 (1919), reh'g denied, 251 U.S. 380 (1920).
Id. at 18.
Id. (citing Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521, 533 (1905), the opinion in which the waiver
first took root).
395 U.S. 711 (1969).
Id. at 720-21.
Id. at 725.
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judges who sentenced defendants to more severe penalties on retrial to
show their reasons on the record and to base those reasons upon the
conduct of the defendant after the original sentencing proceeding. The
primary reason for the unacceptability of vindictiveness is not because it
is unseemly, but because,
[T~he very threat inherent in the exercise of such a punitive policy
would, with respect to those still in prison, serve to 'chill the exercise
of basic constitutional rights'. . . ." A court is 'without right to...
put a price on appeal. A defendant's exercise of a right of appeal
must be free and unfettered. . . . [lit is unfair to use the great power
given to the court to determine sentence to place the defendant in
the dilemma of making an unfree choice."8
Thus the strand of vindictiveness on resentence was born and the due
process strand of "chilling effect" joined to support it. Both of these
trends reappear in Chaffin v. Stynchcombe" approximately fourteen years
later in 1972. As discussed previously in this Article, 6 the Chaffin Court
rejected the "chilling effect" argument on its own terms. The argument
that enhanced sentencing at retrial, vindictive or not, placed an unconstitutional choice upon a defendant between his exercise of his right to
appeal a conviction and the risk of a greater sentence. In Chaffin the
Court specifically limited the utility of the chilling effect doctrine to
application in combination with the rule against vindictiveness.87 And in
that sense it was (to mix metaphors) taken out of the fray by the second
jab of a one-two punch. The Chaffin majority also held that, unlike judge
sentencing, jury sentencing posed virtually no threat of vindictiveness as
long as the jury was not informed of the prior sentence. This holding
virtually eliminated the due process/vindictiveness strand from contention
in any case involving jury sentencing. 8 Insofar as the chilling effect
argument is a dependent part of that strand, the holding eliminated that
argument as well, though as we shall see when we examine Green v.
United States, it has served at least one other useful purpose.
Chaffin also contains a ruling on double jeopardy, and that ruling is
83. Id. at 724 (citing United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. at 582).
84. Id. (citing 'Worcester v. Comm'r, 370 E2d 713, 718 (1st Cir. 1966)).
85. 412 U.S. 17 (1973).
86. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
87. Actually, the Chaffin court held that Pearce had done this. This is a somewhat slanted reading
of Pearce. It is true that in Pearce the prohibited chilling effect was the basis for the holding that
vindictiveness violated a defendant's right to due process. Nowhere in the Pearce opinion, however,
did the Court say that this was the only circumstance in which the chilling effect doctrine would
apply to resentencing after successful appeal.
88. Taken alone this factor seems to eliminate the chilling effect doctrine from most death penalty
resentencing schemes, as in most of them the decision is committed to a jury. See Special Project,
supra note 25, at 1237-38.
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important because it is the last major ruling prior to Bullington on the
applicability of double jeopardy to jury resentencing in a potentially
capital case. Basically it extends the Stroud-Pearce, clean slate doctrine
to jury resentencing in a modem capital case. Stroud itself involved jury
sentencing but under comparatively simple procedures and in an era when
constitutionality of the death penalty was not seriously at issue. The
defendant in Chaffin was not charged with murder and did not receive a
capital sentence on either run through the sentencing gauntlet. Nevertheless, when the Justices began their deliberations in Bullington, they were
faced with a precedent in which, like the case before them, a defendant
had faced the death penalty at his first trial, received a lesser sentence,
successfully appealed his conviction, and was then retried and resentenced
by a jury to a harsher penalty than was meted out at the first sentencing,
in which no error had been found. Under the facts of Bullington the
Chaffin holding definitely limited the room for maneuver.
But the Stroud/Pearce/Chaffinnoose was not the only bond restricting
the movement of the Court in Bullington. In the term prior to Bullington,
the United States Supreme Court decided United States v. DiFrancesco.s9

This was not a death penalty case, and the procedural sequence it presented
for inspection was a somewhat unusual one emerging from the "dangerous
special offender" provision of the Organized Crimes Control Act of 1970.'
Under that statute, the Government was authorized to seek at trial an
enhanced sentence for a felon proved to be a "dangerous special offender," and if the Government was not satisfied with the sentence by
the trial judge, it could obtain appellate review and, if successful, an
increase in sentence on appeal." The Government pursued these remedies
through the Second Circuit which held that the appellate court was barred
89. 449 U.S. 117 (1980).
90. 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1985).
91. The double jeopardy effect of prosecutorial appeals is a very complicated issue raising numerous questions with a variety of answers. See Westen, supra note 13, at 1001; Note, Double
Jeopardy and the Commonwealth's Right to Writs of Error in Criminal Cases, 20 U. RICH. L. REV.
629 (1986); Note, Commonwealth Right ofAppeal in CriminalProceedings,43 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
295 (1986). The conceptual link is that prosecutorial appeals may lead to rehearing in whole or in
part and therefore to a second jeopardy. Where, as in DiFrancesco, the government appeal leads to
further fact-finding proceedings which can be characterized as a continuation of the initial factfinding procedure, the Supreme Court has found no double jeopardy bar. Thus, in Justices of Boston
Municipal Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294 (1984), where a defendant excercised his right to appeal
for jury trial de novo after a guilty verdict by the bench in a two-tier system, the Court held there
was no double jeopardy bar to the jury trial even though the evidence was legally insufficient to
support the original finding of guilty by the bench. See Justice Brennan's discussion of "continuing
jeopardy," id. at 320-22 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Clearly, where there has been a final trial verdict of acquittal, either by judge or jury, or a dismissal
for insufficient evidence, which constitutes an aquittal for purposes of double jeopardy, see, e.g.,
Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978); United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S.
564 (1977), the Double Jeopardy Clause bars prosecutorial appeal, "not only when it might result
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from increasing the defendant's sentence by the double jeopardy clause.92
The reasoning of the circuit court, which became the central issue on
writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, was of particular
significance to the circumstances in Bullington, because it raised squarely
the question of whether a lower sentence at the trial level amounted to
an "acquittal" of a harsher sentence which could not then be imposed
on appeal (or retrial) without incurring double jeopardy. The United States
Supreme Court in DiFrancesco,citing Stroud, Pearceand Chaffin, among
others, held that it did not. Its language is fairly sweeping on this point,
but in constructing its edifice against double jeopardy, the Court left one
door ajar. It noted that the appellate review of a sentence in the Organized
Crime Control Act was part of the entire statutory process of sentence
determination, with notice from the outset that a sentence at the trial level
in a second trial, but also if reversal would translate into further proceedings devoted to the resolution
of factual issues going to the elements of the offense charged." Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S.
140, 146 (1986). This does not apply to trial level dismissals entered before or after jeopardy attaches
which are not based upon a determination of factual guilt or innocence and which are initiated by
motion of the defendant. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 98-99 (1978). It also does not prevent
a state from appealing after aquittal merely to settle questions of law without recourse to retrial,
and a number of states have specifically provided by statute for this contingency. See, e.g., COLO.
REV. STAT. § 16-12-102 (Supp. 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §9903 (1974); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 22-3602 to -3603 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-2315 to -2316 (1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
22, § 1053 (1986).
The prosecution may also appeal dismissals entered before jeopardy attaches. A typical example
is found in Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975), involving government appeal from dismissal
of an indictment, wherein the Court held that, "[An accused must suffer jeopardy before he can
suffer double jeopardy." Id. at 393. See also United States v. Join, 400 U.S. 470, 480 (1971). The
prosecution may also appeal trial court rulings "in favor of the defendant after a verdict of guilty
has been entered by the trier of fact." United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975). This would
presumably include dismissals (not based on insufficiency of evidence-see discussion of United
States v. Burks and United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., supra this note) and orders arresting
judgement and modifying verdicts.
The United States Supreme Court has held that mistrials ordered by the court for "manifest
necessity" (for example, hung jury, Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317 (1984) and mistrials
ordered on motion of the defendant and not based upon prosecutorial or judicial conduct "intended
to provoke the defendant into moving for mistrial," do not trigger the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679 (1982). See also United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600
(1976). Thus it appears that the prosecution may appeal from mistrials as well which it or the trial
judge did not intentionally provoke by their own conduct.
Finally, as DiFrancesco demonstrates, the prosecution may in some instances appeal sentences
and seek imposition of a more severe sentence on appeal (DiFrancesco) or after remand (Pennsylvania
v. Goldhammer, 474 U.S. 28 (1985)).
Setting aside the Supreme Court's rulings on the prosecution's right to appeal sentences (from
which the Court would apparently exclude death sentences-see Pennsylvania v. Goldhammer, 474
U.S. 28, 29-30 (1985) interpreting DiFrancesco), the one relatively consistent thread through the
Court's declamations on the subject of the State's right to appeal and double jeopardy is that the
defendant should not be subjected a second time to a trial on the facts once that has been completed.
Though the Court sometimes looses sight of this thread, it never abandons it. This central principle
accords with the basic purposes underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause announced in Green v.
United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
92. DiFrancesco, 604 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1979).
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was not necessarily final. 93 Then the Court added poignantly, "This limited appeal does not involve a ritual or approximate the ordeal of a trial
on the basic issue of guilt or innocence." '94 The exit sign to the trial
metaphor escape ramp was thereby illuminated for the Bullington majority
to follow.
Indeed, it may have felt it had little choice. It was blocked on one side
by the Stroud/Pearce/Chaffin holdings that, as a central proposition, a
jury's imposition of the death sentence for the first time on retrial was
not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause, and on another by the more
specific holding of DiFrancescothat imposition of a lesser sentence at
the first trial, unlike a finding of guilty on a lesser charge, did not amount
to acquittal of a harsher alternative penalty. The trial metaphor perhaps
seemed the most likely means of escape from the Court's self-constructed
corral. Before we examine closely whether this was true, however, some
attention should be devoted to the yet unexamined third strand, the guilt/
innocence acquittal strand, which served as the trial end of the trial
metaphor employed in Bullington.
That strand is embodied in primarily two cases: Green v. United States9
and Burks v. United States.' In Green, the Court delivered its oft-quoted
statement of purpose behind the right against double jeopardy which has
been discussed above. Applying those principles, the Court held that,
where a defendant faced alternative charges of first and second degree
murder for the same offense and the jury convicted of the lesser charge,
the failure to convict of the more serious charge amounted to acquittal
on that charge, and the defendant could not be retried for it after successful
appeal. The equation of "guilty of a lesser included offense" with acquittal
of the more serious and comprehensive charge explains the mighty labors
of the DiFrancescomajority to distinguish a lower sentence at trial from
"acquittal" of a harsher alternative imposed at a later procedural point.
Green was the chief double jeopardy precedent against which the DiFrancescocourt labored, and as a result, DiFrancescostood as the main
barrier between the result sought by the Bullington majority and the
precedential value of Green.
Another task of precedential value was accomplished in Green which
should be noted before turning to a discussion of Burks. This involved
the severing of the waiver strand, last seen entwined in the holding of
North Carolina v. Pearce.97 In effect, the Court entombed the theory in
93. DiFrancesco,449 U.S. at 135-36.
94. Id. at 136.
95. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
96. 437 U.S. 1(1978).
97. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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the peculiar factual circumstances in which it arose some fifty years
before, involving foreign legal traditions and customs not in tandem with
United States constitutional procedure. 9" The theory was a fiction from
the outset and had become a relic by the time the Green court delivered
the coup de grace. As such its passing would merit little notice except
for the implicit rationale behind the move to end it. That rationale is
present in Green in muted terms, but it appears there nevertheless as
essentially a statement of at least the first step in the chilling effect
syllogism:
Reduced to plain terms, the Government contends that in order to
secure the reversal of an erroneous conviction of one offense, a
defendant must surrender his valid defense of former jeopardy not
only on that offense, but also on a different offense for Which he was
not convicted and which was not involved in his appeal. Or stated
in the terms of this case, he must be willing to barter his constitutional
protection against a second prosecution for an offense punishable by
death as the price of a successful appeal from an erroneous conviction
of another offense for which he has been sentenced to five to twenty
years' imprisonment. As the Court of Appeals said in its first opinion
in this case, a defendant faced with such a "choice" takes a "desperate chance" in securing the reversal of the erroneous conviction.
The law should not, and in our judgment does not, place the defendant
in such an incredible dilemma. Conditioning an appeal of one offense
on a coerced surrender of a valid plea of former jeopardy on another
offense exacts a forfeiture in plain conflict with the constitutional bar
against double jeopardy."
The Court does not quite say that the waiver theory is untenable because
requiring a defendant to waive his right against double jeopardy in order
to pursue his statutory right to appeal chills his right to appeal, but it
. 98. Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521 (1905), which gave birth to the waiver theory, was
one of the "insular cases" arising in the early years of this century from United States territorial
acquisition and expansion. The Trono case itself involved a statutory provision against double
jeopardy directed at the Philippine Islands, which, the Court in Green noted, was, "a territory just
recently conquered with long-established legal procedures that were alien to common law." Green,
355 U.S. at 197. The Court in Green stated: "We do not believe that Trono should be extended
beyond its peculiar factual setting to control the present case," and, "[lI]t seems apparent that a
majority of the Trono Court was unable to agree on any common ground for the conclusion that an
appeal of a lesser offense destroyed a defense of former jeopardy on a greater offense for which the
defendant had already been acquitted." id. It is not an exaggeration to conclude that the Green
majority considered the Trono holding weak and indefensible and stopped short of overruling it
outright by limiting it to its own peculiar facts.
99. 355 U.S. at 193-94. It is worthy of note that the Court in Green assumes that the bar against
double jeopardy has attached to the previous trial for capital murder prior to appeal and that the
choice is between surrendering that right and surrendering the statutory right to appeal. In terms of
chilling effect, however, the interests are much the same as in Bullington: the risk on appeal is
reversal and another exposure to the death penalty.
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does hold clearly that such a choice is not uncoerced. It is a very short
leap from this holding to the proposition that the choice between serving
a life sentence (and foregoing appeal) and risking the death sentence on
retrial is a coerced choice which chills the effective exercise of a basic
procedural right. As noted previously, the Court in Chaffin refused to take
this leap without evidence of judicial vindictiveness on retrial."°
In Burks the Court strengthened and expanded Green by holding that
a reversal on appeal of a guilt/innocence verdict for legally insufficient
evidence, triggers the double jeopardy bar against retrial. Together these
two cases outline a clear exception to the "clean slate" doctrine which
emerged through Pearce: As the Bullington opinion phrased it, "Thus,
the 'clean slate' doctrine recognized in Pearce is inapplicable whenever
a jury agrees or an appellate court decides that the prosecution has not
proved its case."'°' Of course, the holdings of Green and Burks were
not quite that broad. To be more precise, the Court would have had to
add that those cases stood for the proposition that the right against double
jeopardy applied, "whenever the jury agrees or an appellate court decides
that the prosecution has not proved its case," in a trial on guilt or
innocence. The "clean slate" doctrine was developed in cases concerning
application of double jeopardy in circumstances involving resentencing.
Green and Burks dealt only with guilt/innocence trials. The majority in
Bullington relied upon the bridge of the "trial metaphor" to link the
Green and Burks holdings to the sentencing strands running from Stroud
to Bullington itself.
VI. SHORT CUTTING ANALYSIS AND UNWEAVING THE
TANGLED WEB OF CATCH-PHRASE AND METAPHOR
The Bullington escape gambit had come to this: The Court was trapped
in the Bullington building by the nemeses which had plagued it through
two generations of double jeopardy cases. On one side was the "clean
slate" gang (Stroud, Pearce, and Chaffin) cutting off its escape by the
direct route of declaring a double jeopardy bar to a harsher jury sentence
at retrial, and on the other side, DiFrancesco,barring the door to holding
that a lesser sentence by the trial court amounted to an acquittal of a
higher sentence alternative. As the Court saw it, there was only one thing
left to do. From under its robe it extracted its trial metaphor rope ladder,
flung the nether end of it to the adjacent roof of the Green-Burks building
and made its escape. There are, no doubt, those who will say that the
Court's actions on this occasion left a few unanswered questions, and
100. See supra notes 61-63, 67-69 and accompanying text.
101. Bullington, 451 U.S. at 443.
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that it should have stayed to confront the limiting precedent directly. But
by escaping as it did via the trial metaphor, the Court achieved the essential
result it wanted to reach in Bullington without having to fight it out with
those who were blocking the more direct route.
The Polandbullet-dodge maneuver (an antidote to the Bullington escape
gambit): Bound hand and foot by the BullingtonlRumsey trial metaphor,
the Court awaited what must appear to the average reader as certain doom
for a capital sentence based upon an aggravating factor unsupported by
the evidence. But all was not lost. Luckily, at the trial level, the sentencing
tribunal, though erroneously striking the pecuniary gain, aggravating factor as in Rumsey, had nevertheless imposed the death sentence, albeit on
the basis of a factor (especially heinous, cruel or depraved) which the
Court now knew to be fallacious. But the Court still had the death sentence, even though it appeared the Court had lost the reasons for imposing
it.
The problem was that the Court needed to find some way to start over,
to reinforce the now unsupported death sentence. Some way was needed
to wipe out the past mistakes and, as it were, breathe new life into it.
Suddenly, the Court remembered the sleight of hand it had learned years
before from the clean slate gang. It works like a charm. Whenever one
gets into a procedural tangle in this double jeopardy briar patch, one
simply pulls out one's clean slate rule and cuts oneself clear, and, "Presto!",
one is back where he started.
This is exactly what the Court needed. It unsheathed its clean slate
machete, hacked the trial metaphor bonds, and thereby did away with
the trial court's findings on aggravating factors altogether. Then the State
was free to start all over again to prove those factors and to get them
right this time so that at least one of the factors would hold up on appeal
and the death penalty could be resurrected. And, because the death penalty
had been imposed the first time around (even though based on erroneous
findings), presumably nobody would be the worse off.
These (admittedly over-simplified) versions of how the Court decided
Bullington and Polanddemonstrate the central, analytical failing in those
cases and in Rumsey and perhaps in some of their precedents. Essentially,
the Court observed stare decisis in a patchwork fashion and, in attempting
to create readily applicable rules, substitutes legal-jargon gimmicks such
as the trial metaphor and the clean slate doctrine for consistency based
on true analysis. °2 In so doing, the Court works its way out of one selfconstructed predicament while laying the foundation for another.
102. Justice John M. Harlan warned against the fashioning of "mechanical" and "bright-line"
rules to decide double jeopardy issues in United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 480, 486 (1974). See
supra notes 16, 17, 19 and accompanying text.
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It is true that the trial metaphor and clean slate doctrine were originally
conceived on an analytical basis. The seeds of the trial metaphor were
planted in the "acquittal" language of Burks and Green where the double
jeopardy issue did not involve sentencing, but failures of proof at trial,' 0 3
and the analogy to acquittal was both convenient and logically sound.
The clean slate doctrine, as it was christened in Pearce, applied to the
striking of a term sentence and imposition of a longer sentence following
retrial after reversal of conviction on appeal. " The Court there admitted
that the doctrine was fictive insofar as it applied to that portion of a
sentence already executed. 15 But in the abstract, where trial and sentencing are a unitary proceeding and sentencing is trusted to the trial
judge's discretion within statutory limits, it is logical to conclude that
reversal of a conviction and ordering a new trial wipe out what has gone
before and begin the entire proceeding over again. "
It is more difficult to rationalize application of the doctrine in Poland.
There trial and sentencing were bifurcated with the State required at
sentencing to prove aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. 0 7
The State had tried and failed to do that once on the especially heinous,
cruel or depraved factor, and the judge had ruled that the evidence did
not support the pecuniary gain factor as a matter of law.'08 A complete
sentencing trial had occurred, and the government had its chance to prove
its case which it failed to do on one factor and lost through a ruling by
the trial court on another. The defendants had once prepared their defense
to the aggravating factors, presented it and ultimately prevailed through
appeal through the Arizona Supreme Court.
Under these conditions, it is facile to hold simply, as the United States
103. Green concerned the issue of the double jeopardy effects of retrial on the original offense
charged where the original jury had found the defendant guilty of a lesser included offense. Burks
involved the double jeopardy implications of an appellate court's finding that the evidence did not
support a verdict of guilty. In both cases, the Court, after careful analysis of the purposes underlying
the double jeopardy clause (see supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text) decided that the lesser
included offense finding in Green and the appellate reversal in Burks were substantially equivalent
to an acquittal and thus the reasons underlying the Double Jeopirdy Clause should apply. Green,
355 U.S. at 190 ("implicit acquittal"); Burks, 437 U.S. at 16, 18.
104. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 721. Actually the "appeals" in Pearce were post conviction review.
105. Id.
106. The conviction of defendant Pearce was for assault with intent to commit rape. The first
sentence was for a term of 12 to 15 years which would have expired on approximately November
13, 1969. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 713 n. 1. On retrial, after his successful habeas corpus petition and
having served several years of his sentence, Pearce was sentenced to eight years, which would expire
on approximately October 10, 1972, adding, together with time already served, approximately three
years to the actual sentence. Id. The second defendant in Pearce, a man named Rice, had received
a 10 year aggregate sentence for four counts of burglary at the first sentencing. He had served
approximately two and one-half years of that sentence. The resentencing was to terms aggregating
25 years. Id. at 714.
107. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703(B) and (F).
108. Poland, 476 U.S. at 150.
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Supreme Court did in Poland, that reversal of the original conviction
wipes the slate clean."° It is not simply a matter of the sentencing judge
re-exercising his sentencing discretion. Burdens of proof and defense
must be reinstated and again assayed and defended. The entire gauntlet"'
of a sentencing trial must be run again. The State is awarded another
chance with the benefit of an effective trial run and hindsight."' The slate
is obviously not "clean," or it is so only because the United States
Supreme Court says it is.
In Bullington, with minimal analysis, the Supreme Court created a
fairly clear exception to the clean slate doctrine-the trial metaphorand in Poland refused, for whatever reasons, to follow it through to its
logical conclusion. What should the Court have done differently? The
answer to this question lies beyond the catch-phrases of Bullington, Rumsey, and Poland in the purposes underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause
and analysis of those purposes in the context of capital sentencing.
VII. PROPOSED REVISIONS TO THE BULLINGTON,
RUMSEY AND POLAND OPINIONS

The four essential purposes underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause
have already been identified in this Article. "' To recapitulate briefly, they
are:
1. To protect the defendant from repeatedly being subjected to embarrassment, expense and ordeal;
2. To protect the defendant from being compelled to continue to live
in a state of anxiety and insecurity;
3. To protect the defendant from an enhanced possibility that, even
though innocent, he may be found guilty; and,
4. To protect the defendant's right to have his trial completed by a
single tribunal. 113
109. Id. at 157.
110. See Green, 355 U.S. at 190: "Green was in direct peril of being convicted and punished
for first degree murder at his first trial. He was forced to run the gantlet once on that charge and
the jury refused to convict him."
11l. In his dissent in Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (1978), Justice Powell speaks of the dangers
of the prosecutorial "'trial run' [which will] strengthen [the prosecutor's] case. At retrial, for example,
prosecution witnesses may be better prepared for the rigors of cross examination." Id. at 52 (Powell,
J., dissenting). In addition, the prosecution in effect has had full discovery of the defendant's case
as well as a chance to patch up its own.
112. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
113. The first three of these are stated with less precision in Green v. United States, 355 U.S.
at 187-88. Professor Westen and Mr. Drubel have further refined them and suggested the fourth
purpose from sources other than Green. See supra notes 13 and 15 and accompanying text. It is
true that the third purpose listed above-protection from the "enhanced possibility that though
innocent [the defendant] may be proven guilty"-does not translate directly from the guilt/innocence
trial setting to sentencing. At sentencing or resentencing the issue of guilt or innocence has already
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In the words of Justices Douglas and Black in Green, these four items
constitute the "peril" from which the Double Jeopardy Clause protects
citizens. 11 Close examination of all four purposes reveals that from a
procedural perspective they are aimed at two basic, overlapping principles: finality and nonrepetition." 5 Finality is present in the sense of a
reasonable, identifiable and foreseeable ending point where the defendant
been decided and will be unaffected. Nevertheless, in two respects this purpose applies to capital
sentencing. First, there is the risk, enhanced after each prosecutorial "trial run," Crist v. Bretz, 437
U.S. 28, 52 (1978) (Powell, J.,dissenting), that the defendant will receive the death penalty on
resentence even though he may not "deserve" it in terms of the severity of the crime committed
(see Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977)) orin terms of proportionality with defendants committing
similar crimes (See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) and Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782 (1982), wherein the United States Supreme Court appeared to hold that proportionality review
of death sentences was constitutionally required, and Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984),
wherein the Court finally held that it was not). Second, there is the increased risk that, though
innocent of the crime itself and erroneously convicted, the defendant will receive a capital sentence
which, once executed, cannot be changed or recalled. Thus, though the risk of an "erroneous" death
sentence from repeated sentencing hearings may not be numerically greater than risk of conviction
of the innocent at a standard criminal trial, in terms of consequences the risk is much higher, just
as the risk of cancer outweighs the risk of the common cold.
The most comprehensive recent study of erroneous convictions in potentially capital cases indicates
that the risk of convicting an innocent person in a capital case is a very significant factor. Bedau &
Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21 (1987). The
authors' extensive research and scrutiny of cases reveal 343 cases of erroneous conviction of innocent
people in potentially capital cases in the United States in this century. In 137 of these cases the
death sentence was imposed, and in 25 the defendent was executed. In the cases where the death
sentence was not imposed, the defendents frequently served extended prison sentences before the
error was corrected. The authors provide relevant case examples through the late 1970s.
114. Green, 355 U.S. at 190. The majority opinion in Green was "by Mr. Justice Black, announced by Mr. Justice Douglas." Id. at 185.
115. Westen and Drubel identify finality as the essential interest of the defendant in the four
purposes underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause. Westen & Drubel, supra note 13, at 85-99; Westen,
supra note 13, at 1005-10. They include what I identify as the interest in non-repetition in the finality
interest. Westen & Drubel supra note 13, at 86-91. Though the two elements clearly overlap and
have much in common as they relate to double jeopardy, I have separated them for purposes of
facilitating understanding and application of the four purposes underlying the Double Jeopardy
Clause. For example, purposes numbers I and 3 (protection from repeatedly being subjected to
embarrassment, expense and ordeal and the enhanced possibility that, though innocent, the defendant
may be found guilty) speak to finality but more specifically to the dangers in repeated proceedings.
Purpose number 2 (protection from being compelled to live in a state of anxiety and insecurity)
concerns the danger in repeated proceedings, but is more specifically an interest in finality. Purpose
number 4 (the interest of a defendant in having his trial completed by a single tribunal) seems equally
concerned with finality and non-repetition.
Another way of viewing the relation of finality and non-repetition is to observe that some of the
interests in finality (an end to anxiety, insecurity and, to some degree, extended embarrassment and
expense) are in play regardless of whether repetition of a trial occurs. Yet the increased danger of
erroneous conviction is present only where there is in fact a new trial and not just the chance of
one.
The United States Supreme Court has in effect recognized that these elements are contained in
the purposes underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause. See United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332
(1974), wherein the Court refers to the "principles of fairness and finality" and discusses these in
terms of both embarrassment, expense, ordeal and continuing anxiety and the risk of being erroneously
found guilty after repeated trials. Id. at 343.
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can expect the embarrassment, expense and anxiety to end" 6 and the door
to close on the fear of renewed prosecution. Non-repetition is present in
the sense of the danger of prosecutorial harassment and abuse of the
defendant by repeated prosecutions,"17 the unfairness to the defendant of
the advantages gained by the State from repeated "bites at the apple""'
and the increasing risk of error with each repetition of the proceeding. "'
Decisions in double jeopardy cases should begin and end with a thorough analysis of these principles and the four basic purposes they embody
and careful application of those elements to the facts and circumstances
at hand. 2 0 When this approach is applied to death penalty sentencing
cases involving double jeopardy issues, it becomes readily apparent. That
because of the severity of the potential sentence, the stakes in the resolution of the issues-particularly the constitutional issues not necessarily
otherwise related to the death penalty-are raised. For example, when
one speaks of the interest in finality to avoid additional embarrassment,
expense and ordeal, those terms take on intensified meaning in the context
of a capital trial and sentencing. The same is true of the interest in finality
116. See, e.g., United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 486 (1970) (the defendant's interest in
"being able, once and for all, to conclude his confrontation with society"); Smalis v. Pennsylvania,
476 U.S. 140, 145 (1986) ("the interest of the accused in having an end to the proceedings against
him").
117. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 343 (1974): "[Tlhe State shall not be
permitted to make repeated attempts to convict him, 'thereby subjecting him to embarrassment,
expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continued state of anxiety and insecurity.'"
(Citing Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957)). In United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S.
470 (1970), the plurality opinion of Justice Harlan refers to protection against both prosecutorial
and judicial "overreaching." Id. at 484. And in Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (1978), the Court notes
the double jeopardy interest in "minimization of harassing exposure to the harrowing experience of
a criminal trial." Id. at 38. In his dissent in Crist, Justice Powell apparently relies upon the Due
Process Clause and not the Double Jeopardy Clause to protect the defendant against such "prosecutorial abuse." Id. at 50 (Powell, J.,dissenting). Professor Westen and Mr. Drubel have argued
(persuasively, I believe) that the protection against prosecutorial harassment and abuse through retrial
belongs under the Double Jeopardy Clause as well. See Westen & Drubel, supra note 13, at 88
n.40.
118. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352 (1975): The Double Jeopardy Clause
militates against allowing "the prosecutor to seek to persuade a second trier of fact of the defendant's
guilt after having failed with the first." See also discussion of Justice Powell's dissent supra note
11l,
regarding the dangers of the prosecutorial "trial run." This rationale is in large part the basis
for designating the onset of jeopardy as the point where the trial of facts actually begins. Crist v.
Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 31 (1978) (and Powell, J., dissenting at 39). See also Smalis v. Pennsylvania,
476 U.S. 140 (1986): "Thus, whether the trial is to a jury or to the bench, subjecting the defendant
to postacquittal factfinding proceedings going to guilt or innocence violates the Double Jeopardy
Clause." Id. at 145.
119. "[T]he possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty." Green v. United
States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957).
doctrine inNorth Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711
120. After the advent of the clean slate
metaphor inBullingron, the
application inPoland and before use of the trial
(1969), but before its
Supreme Court in United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971), went through a double jeopardy
analysis similar in part to that which I propose. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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to avoid continued anxiety and insecurity and the interest in non-repetition
to avoid abuse, unfairness and further risk of erroneous decision.
This essentially reaffirms a basic characteristic of the death penalty
now adopted as a precedential rule mandating closer scrutiny and higher
standards for sentencing in death penalty cases-the characteristic that
"death is different.""'2 The United States Supreme Court has explained
it in these terms:
From the point of view of the defendant, it is different in both its
severity and its finality. From the point of view of society, the action
of the sovereign in taking the life of one of its citizens also differs
dramatically from any other legitimate state action. It is of vital
importance to the defendant and to the community that any decision
to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason
rather than caprice or emotion.' 22
Applying this principle to the purposes underlying the Double Jeopardy
Clause as they are manifest in Bullington, the Court could have logically
reached the same result in that case without total reliance on the trial
metaphor. In addition, it could have avoided the tangle of metaphors and
catch-words it wound for itself in Poland and reached a different result.
Under the analysis, the opinion in Bullington would have gone something
like this:
As we have established by our examination of Green [and other cases
in which we have catalogued the purposes underlying the Double
Jeopardy Clause], '23 the central procedural concerns of the right
against double jeopardy are the defendant's interest in finality and
in non-repetition of the central factfinding process leading to a verdict. It is in finality that he finds his procedural protection from
additional expense, embarrassment and prolonged anxiety and in nonrepetition that he avoids the risk of prosecutorial abuse, unfair prosecutorial advantage and erroneous conviction.
In regard to decisions on the issue of guilt or innocence, we have
consistently identified acquittal at trial, Green v. United States, 355
121. See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625,
637 (1980); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 181-88
(opinion of Stewart, Powell and Stevens, J.J.); id. at 231-41 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. at 286-91 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 306-10 (Stewart, J.,concurring); id.
at 314-17 (Marshall, J.,concurring). As one commentator has noted, at one time all members of
the United States Supreme Court prior to the resignation of Chief Justice Burger had joined in
opinions accepting the "death is different" principle. Rosen, The "Especially Heinous" Aggravating
Circumstance in Capital Cases-the Standardless Standard, 64 N.C. L. REv. 941,946 n.23 (1986).
122. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1977) (Stevens, J., opinion for the court joined
by Stewart and Powell, J.J.).
123. See, e.g., Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975); United States v. Join, 400 U.S.
470 (1970); Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323 (1970).
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U.S. 184 (1957), and trial or appellate, judicial decisions to the same
effect, Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978), as imposing the
imprimatur of finality on the criminal process and barring non-repetition of the process. The issue before this Court as we see it is
whether the rationale which underlies that holding in regard to guilt/
innocence trials applies to capital sentencing as well.
In the general area of sentencing, where procedures infinitely vary
and judges have been accorded wide discretion, ascertainment of
points of finality has been less certain than in guilt/innocence trials.
Until fairly recently in our history, sentencing was viewed as essentially part of the trial process, and our earlier cases reflect this perspective. Reversal of the trial in effect meant starting over from the
beginning with no perceived rationale for differentiating a sentencing
decision from the trial in chief. If there was to be a retrial, a significant
degree of embarrassment, expense, anxiety and risk of erroneous
conviction would be incurred by the defendant anyway. The prospect
of resentencing added little more. Thus through a number of prior
decisions on resentencing after a successful appeal and retrial, we
developed and applied the so-called, "clean slate doctrine," Stroud
v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919), reh'g denied, 251 U.S. 380
(1920); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1968), reflecting
the standing perception of the nature of trials at the time-primarily
that trial and sentencing were all one process with issues of guilt or
innocence and those of proper sentence part of one, essentially unitary
proceeding.
Since the development of the clean slate doctrine, we have by
necessity undertaken an in-depth philosophical and jurisprudential
review of the nature, purpose and procedure of capital sentencing in
this country. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), reh'g denied,
Jackson v. Georgia, 409 U.S. 902 (1972); Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976).124 Perhaps the most
fundamental principle to emerge from that reexamination is that the
death penalty, as it is now practiced and perceived, is a, "different
kind of punishment. . . in both its severity and its finality [and from]
the point of view of society, . . . differs dramatically from any other
legitimate state action." Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58
(1977). 125
This fundamental difference between the death penalty and other
legitimate sentences has particular significance to the purposes un-

1-24. See also Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) and Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280 (1976).
125. See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625,
637 (1980); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 181-88
(opinion of Stewart, Powell and Stevens, J.J.); id. at 231-41 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. at 286-91 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 306-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id.
at 314-17 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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derlying the Double Jeopardy Clause. It is difficult to imagine a
prospect more likely to inflict-the potential abuses upon the defendant
which the Double Jeopardy Clause is designed to inhibit than the
prospect of a de novo resentencing where one, who has by the same
procedure received a life sentence, faces for the second time that
procedure which may again lead to death. Indeed, the terms we have
used to describe the potential abuses of a second jeopardy ("embarrassment" and "anxiety," for example) seem inadequate to describe the potential effects of resentencing under such conditions.
Certainly if one may suffer significant anxiety for retrial after acquittal
of misdemeanors such as unlawful concealment or shoplifting, or
even for a felony such as robbery, the anxiety of one who has endured
a capital sentencing procedure and received a sentence of life and
again faces the death penalty for the same offense can only be measured in multiples of that suffered by other non-capital defendants.
With the possible exception of a guilt/innocence retrial in a capital
case, it is difficult to imagine a circumstance in which these particular
purposes underlying the right against double jeopardy become more
significant.
Likewise, the expense and ordeal of a capital sentencing procedure
are usually more onerous than the trial of non-capital crimes. As
cases before this Court demonstrate, and as every attorney who
prosecutes or defends death penalty cases knows, often the most
significant and complex part of a capital case is the sentencing phase,
and it is there that efforts and resources for both sides are frequently
concentrated.
Finally, the consequences of error resulting from retrial of sentencing issues in a capital case are enormous compared to most other
types of cases. Here the error literally means "life or death." Capital
sentencing decisions are usually a weighing of evidence to determine
if the state has proved certain aggravating factors. While error in
those decisions is not directly analogous to erroneously convicting
at a guilt/innocence trial an innocent defendant, the risk is still present
that a second sentencer would sentence to death a defendant who,
though guilty of a capital offense, does not deserve the death penalty
under comparable case standards and would not receive it from most
sentencers. This risk increases with the repetition of sentencing hearings and creation of the adversary advantage gained by the State
from the preceding "trial run." Further, with each repetition, the risk
to and pressure upon the defendant rises, and the potential for harassment and abuse of the defendant by repetitive proceedings or the
piling on of new-found accusations also increases. The result is that
the second time around the defendant is faced with new odds and is
in an almost inevitably weakened position.
For these reasons we are unable to continue to treat the sentencing
phase of a capital case as merely an adjunct of the trial for purposes
of attachment of jeopardy. We believe that capital defendants do,
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and by right and reason should, view the sentencing phase of their
capital trial as a point of finality where the embarrassment, anxiety,
expense, and risks of repetition end. There a choice is made between
life and death. There the full power of the state and the resources
of the defendant are brought to bear. There the defendant can expect,
if he chooses, to end his embarrassment, anxiety, expense and ordeal
by accepting the verdict of the sentencer. There, in effect, the jeopardy from which the Constitution protects him reaches a cognizable
end.
We therefore hold that the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution
forbids imposing the death penalty upon a defendant who previously
faced the death penalty for the same offense, went through a fairly
conducted sentencing procedure and received a life sentence or term
of years. In making this ruling, we do not distinguish between capital
sentencing procedures on the basis of relative complexity or resemblance to a guilt/innocence trial. As a result of our holding today,
our previous double jeopardy holding in Stroud v. United States is
overruled. While we do not overrule our prior holding on double
jeopardy in Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, in which the defendant faced a
capital sentence on trial and retrial, we confine that holding to its
pertinent facts which involved actual resentencing to an enhanced
term of years.' 26
Had the Court taken this tact in Bullington rather than resorting to the

trial metaphor, it would have reached the same result but with sounder
implications for decisions in future cases. The Court would have recentered double jeopardy analysis on the purposes recognized and substantiated in Green v. United States, 2 7 thereby reaffirming those purposes and

their central importance in applying the principles of double jeopardy. It
126. The double jeopardy test suggested in this Article is no more indefinite than numerous other
tests which operate in the area of constitutional criminal procedure. It involves some analysis of
reasonable, subjective expectations and perceptions. But so do the "articulable suspicion" test of
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test in Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Compared, perhaps, to the trial metaphor inquiry actually used in
Bullington, it is less definite for transfer to non-capital cases because under the trial metaphor
approach, a reviewing court may, as Justice O'Connor did for the majority in Rumsey, 467 U.S. at
209-10, recite a litany of parallels between the sentencing scheme in question and a standard guilt/
innocence trial and declare similarity if enough significant parallels appear. (Though it is not entirely
clear what enough parallels are or how significant they have to be). Both the finality and nonrepetition prongs of the formula I propose are less mechanical than this in that they incorporate an
inquiry into the protective principles underlying the right against double jeopardy. Where the "death
is different" factor is present in capital sentencing, the formula is heavily weighted to find double
jeopardy. Where it is not, the results are not nearly so certain.
127. 355 U.S. 184 (1957). See also, e.g., Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975); United
States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1970); Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323 (1970). The fourth purpose
underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause, in addition to the three listed in Green, finds its source in
Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949): the defendant's interest in having his trial decided by a single
tribunal. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
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would have recognized that those purposes take on special meaning in
capital sentencing where, because "death is different," the degree of
embarrassment, expense, ordeal and risk of error which attends the death
penalty derives at least in part from factors other than the trauma of a
trial-like proceeding.' 28 As a corollary to this achievement, one might
also expect double jeopardy cases to be richer in reason and analysis than
that appearing in Bullington and Poland, where metaphor and catch-phrase
rule the day.
Applying the above, revised Bullington rationale as precedent would
have left the result in Rumsey unchanged, but would have brought a
different result in Poland. This is true in Rumsey because logical application of the purposes announced in Green, particularly the principle of
non-repetition, would preclude subjecting the defendant a second time to
hearing on a factor which, though erroneously decided as a matter of
law, was decided in favor of the defendant.
It is true in Poland because those same principles would preclude
subjecting the defendant a second time to hearing on distinct factual issues
(whether the State had proved the existence of aggravating factors) which
had once been decided and would preclude allowing the State a second
chance to prove aggravating factors it failed to prove before. 29
' Regardless
of whether one views the decisions on separate aggravating factors as
"acquittals" or "convictions" in terms of the trial metaphor, for double
jeopardy purposes the central ingredients of a trial are present: the factdetermining process has once been run, and on that basis a decision was
made. The defendant has once undergone the embarrassment, expense
and ordeal of the process, endured the protracted state of anxiety and
insecurity (from which, with the appellate decision overturning the aggravating factor supporting the death penalty in Poland, he should have
been freed), 3 ' has once run the risk of receiving the death penalty undeservedly or erroneously and has had the task completed (albeit erro128. Specifically, the severity and finality of the punishment itself: "The only explanation for
the uniqueness of death is its extreme severity. Death is today an unusually severe punishment,
unusual in its pain, in its finality, and in its enormity. No other existing punishment is comparable
to death in terms of physical and mental suffering." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 287 (Brennan,
J., concurring); "[T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment,
however long. Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term
differs from one of only a year or two." Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1975).
129. This specifically refers to the State's second shot at the atrocious, heinous and depraved
factor which was reversed twice on appeal for lack of sufficient evidence. But the purposes underlying
the bar against double jeopardy would also preclude rehearing on the pecuniary gain factor (dismissed
by error of the trial court) or introduction of new factors at the rehearing. Simply put, the defendant
has gone through the expense, embarrassment, ordeal and risk once. The State has had a fair chance
to prove its case for death and ultimately failed. Repetition renews and prolongs the very factors
against which the principle of double jeopardy protects the defendant.
130. See supra note 48.
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neously) by a single tribunal. When the running of this gauntlet is considered
in light of the added pressure on all points in a capital trial, a factor
recognized by the United States Supreme Court's repeated acknowledgements that the death penalty is different, the absurdity of applying
the clean slate doctrine at such a juncture should be readily apparent.
Once a capital sentencing procedure has been endured, the slate is not
clean and can never be. In short, the clean slate doctrine has no place in
death penalty sentencing.
Thus under the proposed analysis, the Court in Poland would have
held, applying the double jeopardy principles of Green, which were
reaffirmed and applied in the capital sentencing context of Bullington,
that the principle of double jeopardy bars resentencing of a defendant in
a capital case where the defendant first received a life sentence (as in
Bullington and Rumsey) or received a death sentence based upon aggravating factors not substantiated on appeal (as in Poland). The essence of
this proposed analysis is that the State gets one time at bat and, that
accomplished, the risks and strains of capital sentencing being so severe,
the State will not be allowed a second chance to subject the defendant
to the repeated consequences.
VIII. ANOTHER OPTION: THE DORMANT DOCTRINE OF
CHILLING EFFECT
The changes this Article proposes for Bullington would not resurrect
the chilling effect doctrine, which was badly crippled if not annihilated,
by the United States Supreme Court in Pearce v. North Carolina and
Chaffin v. Stynchcombe. 3' It is important to recall that the chilling effect
doctrine is not based upon the principle of double jeopardy but the Due
Process Clause. A ruling based entirely upon principles of double jeopardy
will not necessarily disturb the chilling effect doctrine, but issues that
and double jeopardy often spring from similar
give rise to that doctrine
32
1
contexts.
factual
As suggested previously, the procedural dilemma' 33 faced by the
Bullington and Rumsey defendants in their contemplation of appeal is
loaded with elements which suggest application of the chilling effect
131. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969); Chaffin, 412 U.S. 17 (1982). See discussion of the holding
in these cases relevant to the chilling effect doctrine supra notes 61-65 and 80-84 and accompanying
text.
132. For example, such factual contexts as those in Bullington and Ramsey, where the defendants,
who had received life sentences, risked again facing the death penalty by appealing their guilty
verdicts, but not similar to the context of Poland, where the defendants received death sentences
the first time around and thus had nothing to lose on appeal.
133. The dilemma is to accept one's conviction with its attendant life sentence or to appeal and
risk the death penalty on resentencing after retrial.
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doctrine.' 3 4 Essentially these elements include the juxtaposition of a defendant's basic rights or interests (the right to jury trial, as in United
States v. Jackson, 3' 5 the right to appeal, as in Pearce, Chaffin, Bullington
and Rumsey with the risk of increased sentence by exercising those rights.
Just as the presence of the death penalty adds new weight to the purposes
underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause, it also intensifies the juxtaposition of rights and the danger resulting from their exercise under the
chilling effect scenario.
This is particularly true if the right to appeal a capital conviction rises
to the level of constitutional protection. While the prevailing understanding on the current Supreme Court seems to be that there is no constitutional
right to appeal a guilt/innocence conviction,' 36 it is not altogether clear
that the Court would so hold were it faced directly with this question in
a capital case.' 37 Even if the right to appeal a capital conviction is not
constitutionally protected, the gravity of the offense and the potential
134. See supra notes 58-69 and accompanying text.
135. 390 U.S. 570 (1967). See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 750-51 (1983); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S.
651, 656 (1977).
137. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) is the modem precedent for the rule that there is no
constitutional right to appellate review. There, in holding that once a state provided a right of appeal,
it could not discriminate on the basis of wealth in the exercise of that right, the Court stated: "It is
true that a State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate review at all." Id.
at 18. In support the Court cited McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894) and offered no further
analysis. In McKane the Court held in a non-capital case, where a stay of execution was granted
pending appeal, one convicted was not entitled to bail while the appeal was being decided. The
Court stated:
A review by an appellate court of the final judgement in a criminal case, however
grave the offense of which the accused is convicted, was not at common law,
and is not now, a necessary element of due process of law. It is wholly within
the discretion of the state to allow or not to allow sucha review.
Id. at 687.
At least two of the current justices on the United States Supreme Court have expressed doubt that
this is the current law. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 756 n. I (1983) (Brennan, J., joined by
Marshall, J., dissenting):
The Court surprisingly announces that '[Tlhere is, of course, no constitutional
right to an appeal.' . . . That statement, besides being unnecessary to its decision, is quite arguably wrong. . . . I also have little doubt that [if the question
were before us today] we would decide that a State must afford at least some
opportunity for review of convictions, whether through the familiar mechanism
of appeal or through some form of collateral review. . . . Of course, a case
presenting this question is unlikely to arise for the very reason that a right of
appeal is now universal for significant criminal convictions.
Id.
The Court has indicated that some form of review is constitutionally mandated for the penalty
phase of capital cases. Justices Stewart, Powell and Stevens strongly suggest this in Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. at 198, 204-06 (opinion of Stewart, Powell and Stevens, J.J.). See also Zant v. Stephens,
462 U.S. 862, 879 (1983) and Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 960 (1983) (Stevens and Powell,
J.J., concurring). The majority in Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984), while holding that review
of a death sentence for proportionality with other sentences for similar crimes was not required by
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consequences of conviction weigh heavily in favor of striking impediments to its exercise. In capital cases both sides of the juxtaposition 38
increase their weight: the interest in appealing the guilt/innocence conviction is stronger, and the potential consequences of doing so are greater. 39
For the reasons suggested, the Court in Bullington and Rumsey could
have, in whole or in part, based its rulings favorable to the defendants,
on the chilling effect doctrine. Had it done so and still been inclined to
affirm the convictions of the Poland brothers, it would have found a
sounder basis for distinguishing those cases from Poland than the clean
slate rationale it employed. Clearly in Poland, where the original sentence
was death, there is little basis for claiming a chilling effect on appeal.
And this is the primary, rational difference between Bullington and Rumsey on the one hand and Poland on the other and the only basis upon
which the issue of "acquittal" of the death penalty matters. Where there
is "acquittal" (of the death sentence) below, one is "chilled" against
risking a death sentence again by filing an appeal attacking the guilty
verdict. Whether one is "acquitted" (of the death sentence) below is not
central to whether the purposes underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause
should operate to bar resentencing to death. The Court was correct to
focus upon "acquittal" in Bullington and Rumsey. It simply applied it
under the wrong doctrine.
IX. CONCLUSION
There is little cause to believe that in capital sentencing cases the United
States Supreme Court will soon reclaim the previous track of sound
reasoning which it demonstrated in Green concerning the purposes underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause-reasoning now stunted and disfigured by the trial metaphor and clean slate doctrine. It is also unlikely
the Court will soon reclaim the logically sound but virtually abandoned
the Eighth Amendment in order to avoid arbitrary imposition of the death penalty, appeared to leave
intact the proposition that some form of review was required. Id. at 53-54. The Pulley majority
failed to state that proposition clearly enough for Justice Stevens, however, who concurred separately
to emphasize that very point. Id. at 54-59. (Stevens, J., concurring). If appellate review is constitutionally required of the death penalty itself because of the irrevocable nature of the penalty, it is
certainly arguable that review is required of the conviction upon which the penalty is (or may be)
based.
138. In Jackson, where the chilling effect doctrine was applied, the juxtaposition was between
the right to jury trial and the risk of the death penalty which could not be imposed if the defendant
elected to be tried by a judge. 390 U.S. at 571.
139. Of course in a capital case the juxtaposition occurs only where one is convicted but does
not receive the death penalty. Yet, where one is convicted of a capital crime, interest in appealing
such a conviction will usually be greater than in other felonies. Justice Frankfurter believed that to
be the case and attributed it to the sui generis nature of capital offenses. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12, 21 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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chilling effect doctrine. This state of affairs represents the defeat of timetested legal principle and reasoned analysis by unstated policy-a policy
favoring imposition of the death penalty and finding its source, if not in
some instances in the Court itself, at least in the Court's studied deference
to legislative will. It also presents a case study in result-oriented jurisprudence and the use of legal sophistry and the twisting of legal authority
to achieve predetermined results in a particular case. While admittedly
this practice is not only common but often lauded, it has worked particular
mischief in the area of double jeopardy. In its operation, the principle of
double jeopardy is so entwined in complex procedural scenarios, the
sophistry and bending of legal authority in one instance often merely
enhances the complexity of the labyrinth at the next turn.The too-clever
fashioner of expedient law becomes entangled in his own web.
In the cases of Bullington, Rumsey, and particularly Poland, this tendency springs at least in part from a failure or refusal by the Court to
acknowledge the overriding purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause: to
protect the individual (in this case the defendant) against abuses by the
Government and the systems it fosters. (Indeed this is the overriding
purpose of all individual constitutional rights, including the Due Process
Clause underlying the chilling effect doctrine). At its heart the Double
Jeopardy Clause is simply a prophylactic to shield the defendant from
the inevitable excessive rigors of an imperfect justice system. This purpose
was specifically acknowledged in Green,"4 and the obvious result where
such a purpose is enforced is that some defendants will be insulated from
the full reach of the law and the will of duly elected legislators. The
Court's confrontation with this prospect in Poland, armed with the precedents of the trial metaphor of Bullington and the clean slate doctrine of
Pearce, seems to have begun the gyrations in Poland which led to its
illogical and inconsistent result.
The defense lawyer's antidote to this tendency in capital sentencing
cases, if there is an antidote, is to argue as forcefully as possible for a
return to the basic principles underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause (and
the chilling effect doctrine) and for less reliance upon catch-phrases and
the quick fix. Ironically, it is the more conservative argument and the
4
one closest to the original design of the Double Jeopardy Clause. ' It is
140. 355 U.S. at 190. The purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause as essentially protective is
well established. In U.S. ex. rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943), Justice Frankfurter noted
that the Clause, "is part of the protection of the Constitution against pressures and penalties that
offend civilized notions of justice." Id. at 555 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also D. FELLMAN,
THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS TODAY 353 (1969).
141. It is noteworthy that while at least one early state constitution adopted a double jeopardy
clause limiting protection to those who had been once acquitted, N.H. CONST. OF 1784, art. I, § 16,
the principle in effect in England and that adopted by most other states and our Federal Constitution,
is not so limited. See Sigler, A History of Double Jeopardy, supra note 10, at 300-307.
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also unfortunately the approach which will require courts to do the most
work as it involves more careful and detailed analysis in individual cases
of the procedural facts and the law as it applies. If it is followed honestly,
however, it will also lead to more consistent and lasting results.

